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LEGAL ALIENS, LOCAL CITIZENS: THE HISTORICAL,
CONSTITUTIONAL AND THEORETICAL
MEANINGS OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE
JAmiN B. RASKINt
Citizen: la: an inhabitant of a city or town
2a: a member of a state
1
There is no more invariable rule in the history of society: The further
electoral rights are extended, the greater is the need for extending them: for
after each concession the strength of democracy increases, and its demands
increase with its strength.
2
INTRODUCTION
Democracy promises rule by "the people," but the theory of
democracy implies no specific set of arrangements for political
membership or participation.3  In practice, democracies have
always deemed whole categories of people unfit to govern, denying
them the vote and thus the opportunity to participate in the
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington College of Law at The American
University; A.B. Harvard College 1983;J.D. Harvard Law School 1987. Research for
this Article was supported by a grant from the Washington College of Law. I would
like to thank Dean Elliott Milstein for his support and the following persons for their
comments on this project: Gerald Neuman, Cass Sunstein, Diane OrentlicherJames
Boyle, Bernard Corr, Mark Hager, Joan Williams, Linda Bozniak, and Gary Peller.
I was also blessed with devoted research assistants, led by Barbara de La Viez, and
including Valerie David, Randy Kravis, Carla Markim, and Cate Sutter. This article
is dedicated to the late Judith N. Shklar and to the good people of Takoma Park,
Maryland.
I WEBsTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 411 (1981).
2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 2 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 10 (Henry Reeve trans., &
Phillips Bradley ed., Knopf 1946) (1840).
3 Most dictionaries define democracy as "government by the people" but do not
define "the people." See, e.g., WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 600
(1981). Abraham Lincoln's elegant and resounding formulation in the Gettysburg
Address-"government of the people, by the people, and for the people"-has seized
and held the American democratic imagination despite, or perhaps because of, the
fact that the exact meaning of "the people" is left unspoken and, therefore,
historically dynamic. See GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT
REMADE AMERICA 127-33, 145-47 (1992) (furnishing an exegesis of the address and
arguing that it accomplished an "intellectual revolution" in American political thought
by defining the American experiment as "the people's" commitment to the principles
of liberty and equality embodied in the Declaration of Independence rather than a
compact among sovereign states).
(1391)
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essential and representative act of democratic politics. 4 But if
"universal suffrage" for all persons living in the governed jurisdic-
tion is not logically required by democratic ideology, through social
struggle it has almost always become a political imperative in
democratic history.
5
In American history, the desire to exclude people from political
membership on the basis of property, wealth, race, and gender has
been overcome by the radical demand to grant the vote to all
inhabitants of the governed community.6 Taking the form of
progressive waves of popular struggle, the political imperative of
"universal suffrage" has moved the various levels of the American
regime ever closer to the ideal of becoming what I want to call
"polities of presence," communities governed by all adults living
within them. The circle of voting membership in the democracy has
so far widened to incorporate: people without taxable property or
4 For example, Athenian democracy, the fountain of so many democratic images
and hopes, was officially closed to women, slaves, colonial subjects, and aliens. See
generally I.F. STONE, THE TRIAL OF SOCRATES (1988). Aristotle thought that "not all
those are to be regarded as citizens without whom there would not be a city."
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, bk. 3, ch. 5, at 93 (Carnes Lord trans., 1984).
5 Cf. JUDITH N. SHKLAR, AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP: THE QUEST FOR INCLUSION 37
(1991) ("No historically significant form of government or of citizenship is in
principle incompatible with the exclusion of large groups of people, but natural-rights
theory makes it very difficult to find good reasons for excluding anyone from full
political membership in a modern republic.").
8 The history of suffrage in the United States has been defined by successive waves
of political struggle and resistance, culminating in formal political inclusion. The
theme of progressive inclusivity in the franchise is common in both constitutional
case law and the literature on voting. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555,
586-87 (1964) (noting that "history has seen a continuing expansion of the scope of
the right of suffrage in this country" before holding that the temporary reapportion-
ment of the Alabama legislature was "an appropriate.., exercise ofjudicial power");
KIRK H. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES at vii (2d ed.
Greenwood Press 1969) (1918) ("[A] vigorous fight has been goingon ever since 1776
to secure suffrage for some large and discontented group-ever growing larger and
more discontented until it finally embraced the women. And in the wake of this
demand the suffrage franchise has expanded slowly, grudgingly, and by compromising
steps. The progress still continues in the same laborious fashion."). But see Robert
J. Steinfeld, Property and Suffrage in the Early American Republic, 41 STAN. L. REV. 335,
336-37 (1989) (expressing reservations about "this all-too-familiar... [Whig] history
of the suffrage").
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income, 7 African-Americans, 8 women,9 and eighteen-year-olds, 10
to take the four most prominent categories of those enfranchised
after political struggle.
11
But if the story of expanding American suffrage captures a
significant part of our history, there is somewhat more to the
picture than meets the eye. As the franchise has expanded over the
centuries to take in nearly all adult citizens, one group which voted
and participated, at various points over a 150-year period, in at least
twenty-two states and territories, lost its historic access to the ballot:
inhabitants of individual states who are not citizens of the United
States or, to use the reifying but inescapable idiom of immigration
law, resident aliens. 12 Today, with the extraordinary, though still
largely unwritten,13 history of alien suffrage safely hidden from
7 See generally CHILTON WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE FROM PROPERTY TO
DEMOCRACY 1760-1860 (1960) (tracing the dismantling of the property and wealth
qualifications).
8 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
9 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
1o See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
11 The best overview of these transformations in the franchise is found in SHKLAR,
supra note 5 at 15-19, 25-62 (discussing the four expansions of suffrage in the realm
of citizenship). For discussions of specific franchise enlargements, see generally ERIC
FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877 (Henry S.
Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) (discussing agitation for the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments and analyzing the efforts during Reconstruction to bring
African-Americans into the franchise); LINDA G. FORD, IRON-JAWED ANGELS: THE
SUFFRAGE MILITANCY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN'S PARTY (1991) (discussing the role
of militancy in the coming of women's suffrage); WILLIAM GILLETTE, THE RIGHT TO
VOTE: POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1965) (discussing
the political twists and turns leading up to enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment).
To date, there is no apparently thorough historical account of the passage of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment enfranchising 18-year-olds.
12 1 am aware of the pejorative, if not extraterrestrial, resonances emanating from
the word "alien." Unfortunately, the term possesses a legal significance which makes
it difficult to replace in every context. Moreover, the best alternative-"noncitizen"-is
misleading since my argument is that people who do not qualify as national citizens
can nonetheless be citizens of their state or, more importantly, their local communi-
ties. See generally Kevin R. Johnson, A "Hard Look" at the Executive Branch's Asylum
Decisions, UTAH L. REV. 279, 281 n.5 (1991) (arguing that the use of the word "alien"
in the Immigration & Naturalization Act is dehumanizing and carries subtly racist
connotations).
is Legal observers who have ventured into this field have correctly noted the
dramatic absence of professional historical accounts of alien suffrage. See Gerald M.
Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV.
1092, 1093-94 (1977) (stating that little has been written on the history of suffrage in
the United States, particularly alien suffrage); see also Gerald L. Neuman, "We Are the
People":• Alien Suffrage in German and American Perspective, 13 MICH.J. INT'L L. 259,
292 n.214 (1992) (citing Rosberg supra, at 1093-94). Regardless of intellectual
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view, the U.S. citizenship voting qualification ropes off the franchise
in every American state from participation by non-U.S. citizens. As
a marker at the perimeter of the American body politic, the citizen-
ship qualification carries the aura of inevitability that once attached
to property, race, and gender qualifications.
In this Article, I will argue that the current blanket exclusion of
noncitizens from the ballot is neither constitutionally required nor
historically normal. Moreover, the disenfranchisement of aliens at
the local level is vulnerable to deep theoretical objections since
resident aliens-who are governed, taxed, and often drafted just like
citizens-have a strong democratic claim to being considered
members, indeed citizens, of their local communities. 14 Although
democratic theory cannot resolve the foundational political question
of who belongs to "the people," the ideological traditions of both
liberalism and republicanism make available compelling arguments
for the inclusion of noncitizens as voters in local elections. 15 The
bedrock hostility of the liberal rights tradition to taxation and
governance without representation makes noncitizen voting a
logically unassailable, if not clearly mandatory, democratic practice.
Republicanism presents a somewhat more complicated picture given
its historic compatibility with exclusionary practices, but a progres-
sive commitment to dialogic politics and the constitutive value of
participation is arguably vindicated by defining universal suffrage
without regard to nation-state citizenship. These arguments are
deepened by evolving international norms of community-based
democracy and human rights and strengthened by important
instrumental considerations relating to the surge in immigration
which the United States is currently experiencing.
differences, I am deeply indebted to both of these gifted scholars. Rosberg's article
re-opened the question of alien suffrage for our time, and Neuman's work of
comparative scholarship is consistently useful and surpassingly provocative. They
have made my task much more interesting and have been forthcoming in comment-
ing on the ideas proposed in this Article.
14 The question of participation at the state and national level (these levels are
linked by our constitutional regime) presents more difficult problems. See infra part
II.D.
1" I do not mean to suggest that either of these theoretical traditions compels the
adoption of alien suffrage. As Morton Horwitz has recently reminded us, abstract
theoretical propositions have never decided concrete cases requiring choices about
values. See MORTON J. HoRWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-
1960, at 271 (1992) ("The idea that something concrete really follows from one's
abstract position on, say, natural rights versus positivism is widely believed. Yet in
American history natural rights has equally served both abolitionists and the
defenders of the rights of ownership in human and non-human property.").
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Part I sketches the role alien suffrage has played in American
history. The practice figured importantly in our nation-building
process 16 until it was finally undone by the xenophobic national-
ism preceding and accompanying World War 1.17 The state
legislatures which enacted alien suffrage policies operated from a
paradigm of strong federalism; most believed that, just as the
United States had citizens, individual states could have citizens of
their own.18 Their motivation for extending the ballot to aliens
varied according to place and time, but it was always a mixture of
instrumental policy and democratic principle. In the eighteenth
century, alien voting occupied a logical place in a self-defined
immigrant republic of propertied white men: It reflected both an
openness to newcomers and the idea that the defining principle for
political membership was not American citizenship but the
exclusionary categories of race, gender, property, and wealth. 19
Later, especially in the mid-nineteenth century, many states hoped
to encourage rapid settlement by enfranchising aliens;20 they knew
that aliens were seeking the opportunity to participate in local
affairs and the sense of belonging and respect that the ballot
symbolized, the sense Judith Shklar has called "citizenship as stand-
ing."2
1
From the beginning, however, proponents of alien suffrage also
justified the practice on the higher ground of democratic principle,
especially natural-rights arguments. The state judicial opinions
upholding alien suffrage,22 the supportive speeches made in state
constitutional conventions, 23 and various remarks made in the
United States Senate thus provide a rich source of principled
arguments for reviving alien suffrage today.
Part II provides a constitutional analysis concluding that state
enfranchisement of noncitizens is neither forbidden by the Constitu-
tion, as is commonly assumed,24 nor compelled by it,25 as was
argued by Gerald Rosberg in an important article published in
16 See infra part I.A.
17 See infra notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 36-38 & 82 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 87-90, 125-26 and accompanying text.
21 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 3.
' See infra notes 74-81, 277-82 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text.
24 See infra parts II.A-.C.
25 See infra part II.D.
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1977.26 Rather, this Article shows that noncitizen suffrage is a
franchise issue reserved to the states by Article I of the Constitu-
tion.27 Furthermore, granting the vote to aliens does not offend
the Equal Protection Clause, 28 the Naturalization Clause,2 9 or any
other constitutional principle.
30
Part III presents the normative argument for reviving alien
suffrage at the local level. The argument begins by generalizing old-
fashioned democratic principles which were used to justify white
male alien suffrage in the American past.31  Although these
principles did not provide enough armor for alien suffrage to
withstand the rise of anti-immigration sentiment at the turn of the
century and militant nationalism at the time of World War I, they
may yet reemerge in the contemporary context of heavy immigra-
tion and international movement toward "[c]ommunity-based
democracy."32 This movement, following the emergence of a
global market and the corresponding dilution of national bound-
aries, would invite us to treat local governments as "polities of
presence" in which all community inhabitants, not just those who
are citizens of the superordinate nation-state, form the electorate.
Alien suffrage would thus become part of a basic human right to
democracy. This logic is already partially at work in Europe, as the
proposed Maastricht Treaty for the European community contains
a provision for local voting by European nationals in their city of
residence regardless of state citizenship.
33
Part IV canvasses the current status of noncitizen voting in the
United States and describes in some detail the experience of the
City of Takoma Park, Maryland, which in 1992 became the first
American municipality in decades to amend its charter specifically
to extend the franchise to noncitizens in local elections.34 Takoma
Park's experience embodies the cluster of legal and theoretical
issues which can emerge when localities attempt to effect this local
constitutional change. If the democratic argument for alien suffrage
26 See generally Rosberg, supra note 13 (reintroducing the issue of alien suffrage
in legal debate).
2 See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
28 See infra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.
29 See discussion infra part II.C.
30 See discussion infra part II.B.
31 See discussion infra part III.A.
32 Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies,
FOREIGN PoLIcY, Spring 1992, at 158, 158 (1992).
33 See infra notes 361-63 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 375-89 and accompanying text.
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in our history can be recaptured and reconstructed, it is possible
that Takoma Park will become an early precedent for grass-roots
constitutional politics in the twenty-first century.
I. ALIEN SUFFRAGE AND THE COMPLEX MEANINGS OF CITIZENSHIP
UNDER FEDERALISM: A HISTORICAL SKETCH
Until it was finally undone by the xenophobic nationalism
attending World War I, alien suffrage figured importantly in
America's nation-building process and in its struggle to define the
dimensions and scope of democratic membership. Where alien
suffrage was adopted, the practice was seen as conducive to a
desired immigration (and assimilation) of foreigners and consistent
with basic principles of democratic government. Moreover, the
enactment of noncitizen voting laws was widely recognized as
permissible within the constitutional regime of electoral federal-
ism.35 The class of aliens-or, more precisely, white male aliens-
exercised the right to vote in at least twenty-two states or territories
during the nineteenth century.3 6 After a surge in anti-immigrant
emotion at the turn of the century, there was a steady decline in
alien suffrage and Arkansas became the last state to abandon
noncitizen suffrage in 1926.3
7
As a chapter in the history of American federalism, the period
of alien suffrage reflected a conception of states as sovereign
political entities. The states with alien suffrage allowed non-U.S.
citizens to participate in voting at all levels of American govern-
ment, thereby turning them, explicitly or implicitly, into "citizens"
of the state itself.38 Participant states were thus exercising inde-
35 See infra parts II.A-.B.
36 See Leon E. Aylsworth, The Passing of Alien Suffrage, 25 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 114,
114 (1931).
37 See id.
38 Gerald Neuman has pointed out that the "early examples of alien suffrage were
linked with the confusion over the relationship between state and federal citizenship."
Neuman, supra note 13, at 293. There is nothing inconsistent with federalism in the
idea that states may create state citizens of their own so long as they do not try to
confer on any person national citizenship, a power which is the exclusive province of
Congress. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Fourteenth Amendment provides
only that "[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Thus, while states may not deprive any born
or naturalized U.S. citizen of state citizenship, nowhere does the Fourteenth
Amendment, or any other constitutional provision, prevent states from enfranchising,
or conferring citizenship for local state purposes on persons not born or naturalized
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pendence from the national government for the purposes of
communal political self-definition.
In choosing to confer the rights of political membership on
aliens, these states were recognizing meanings of citizenship apart
from the notion of mere membership in the nation-state. One
meaning, which I would call "citizenship as presence," defined
citizens as all those people actually present and participating in the
life of the local and state community. In this sense, alien suffrage
was simply a recognition of the continuing presence and importance
of aliens in American social life. A second meaning, which I would
call a "citizenship of integration," reflects the intentional public
policy of assimilating aliens to local values and practices. Finally,
alien suffrage jurisdictions were acting on a theory of "citizenship
as standing."39 According to the theory of "citizenship as stand-
ing," the right to vote is an emblem of public recognition and
respect even more than it is an instrument for exercising political
power.40 Alien suffrage represented a victory for aliens seeking
recognition and an improved place in American society. For, as
Shklar writes, the "ballot has always been a certificate of full
membership in society, and its value depends primarily on its
capacity to confer a minimum of social dignity."41
War has exercised powerful effects on the franchise. Yet, while
foreign wars broadened suffrage opportunities for women and
African-Americans, 42 aliens lost ground in two war-related periods
of nationalism and anti-immigrant emotion. The War of 1812
reversed the spread of alien suffrage, and the xenophobia surround-
ing World War I, for all intents and purposes, closed the curtain on
the practice. In the wake of World War I, the vertical primacy of
in the United States.
39 SHMrAR, supra note 5, at 3. Shklar identifies three other principal meanings of
citizenship: "active participation or 'good' citizenship," "citizenship as nationality,"
and "ideal republican citizenship." Id.
40 In American history, the struggle for recognition has been closely linked to
efforts by various subordinate groups to distance themselves from the status of slaves.
In the four great expansions of the suffrage, slavery was always a presence
in the language of political argument. The Colonists rebelling against
English rule, the white males disenfranchised by property and tax qualifica-
tions, the freedmen after the Civil War, and finally women all protested that
they were reduced to the level of slaves if they did not have the vote and
equal representation.
Id. at 16.
41 Id. at 2.
42 See id. at 53-62.
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nation-state citizenship was firmly established over citizenship's
other possible meanings. There was, however, an exception to the
constraining effects of war on alien suffrage: for complex reasons,
the North's victory in the Civil War acted as a catalyst for the spread
of alien suffrage in the late nineteenth century.
A. Voting Rights for All White Men of Property:
Alien Suffrage in the Early Republic
The practice of noncitizen voting first appeared in the colonies,
which generally required only that voters be local "inhabitants or
residents," and not British citizens.4 3 This early liberalism did not
reflect universal tolerance, but simply the fact that "the ethnocen-
trism of the colonial period was primarily religious and only
secondarily nationalistic." 44 Thus, many alien "inhabitants" who
met the appropriate property, wealth, race, religion, and gender
tests possessed the right to vote in the colonies. For example,
French Huguenots voted in South Carolina, where the "electoral law
had been so loosely drawn, it was said, that with only a property
qualification every pirate of the Red Sea operating from a Carolina
base could vote if he wanted to."45 There was widespread alien
voting in the colony's 1701 election, and despite conservative
protests, the South Carolina Assembly in 1704 enacted an electoral
law which formally allowed voting by aliens.
46
43 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 15. Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire,
and Virginia did not even require residence or inhabitation because not all property-
owners necessarily lived on their property. See id.
44 MAURICE R. DAVIE, WORLD IMMIGRATION 37 (1936) (paraphrasing Lawrence
Guy Brown).
45 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 53.
46 See ALBERT E. McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH
COLONIES IN AMERICA 140 (Burt Franklin 1969) (1905). Describing the 1701 election
as a "scene of riot, intemperance, and confusion," id. at 137 (citing 1 ALEXANDER
HEWATT, AN HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE COLONIES OF
SOUTH CAROLINA AND GEORGIA 151 (1779)), several conservative Englishmen from
Colleton County filed this complaint with the colonial government:
"[T]he votes of very many unqualify'd Aliens were taken & enter'd ... a
great number of Servants & poor & indigent persons voted promiscuously
with their Masters & Creditors, and also several free Negroes were receiv'd,
& taken for as good Electors as the best Freeholders in the Province. So
that we leave it with Your Lordships to judge, whether admitting Aliens,
Strangers, Servants, Negroes, &c., as good and qualified Voters, can be
thought any ways agreeable to King Charles' Patent to Your Lordships, or
the English Constitution of Government."
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Neuman has observed that, during the colonial period, "the
practices of British nationality law had coexisted with a practice of
local naturalization valid only within a particular colony."47 Thus,
the idea emerged that each colony could make citizens of its own
and give them the right to vote. But some colonies did not even
require inhabitants to be locally naturalized citizens in order to have
the franchise. In Pennsylvania, for example, the large "German
population evidently voted and held local office, with or without
benefit of either private acts of naturalization or the special
provincial statute passed in 1742, two years after the imperial Parlia-
ment provided for naturalization in the empire as a whole."
48
Alien suffrage survived the Revolution in 1776 as many states
granted foreigners state "citizenship," a status which was "given
extraterritorial consequences by the privileges and immunities
clause of the Articles of Confederation." 49 Vermont's first Consti-
tution allowed for both the naturalization and enfranchisement of
aliens, and the young Commonwealth of Virginia accomplished the
same purposes by statute.50 In the Commonwealth of Pennsylva-
nia, after only two years of residence, aliens were permitted to
vote.51 Even though the new federal Constitution delegated to
Congress the power to "establish an uniform Rule of Naturaliza-
tion,"52 it still "took three decades to settle the exclusivity of the
federal power to naturalize to national citizenship, and even
thereafter the possibility of state conferral of state citizenship
seemingly remained."
5 3
Id. (quoting WILLIAM J. RIVERS, A SKETCH OF THE HISTORY OF SOUTH CAROLINA TO
THE CLOSE OR THE PROPRIETARY GOVERNMENT BY THE REVOLUTION OF 1719 app. at
455 (1856)). But the newly elected Governor and Assembly, presiding over a coalition
of the pro-Anglican Church faction and the immigrant French, rejected appeals for
narrowing the electorate, and a similar election occurred in 1703. See id. at 137-38.
47 Neuman, supra note 13, at 292.
48 WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 174.
49 Neuman, supra note 13, at 292 (citingJAMES H. KETTNER, THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AMERICAN CmZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 219-24 (1978)).
50 See id. at 293-94. Neuman's fine historical reconstruction shows that alien
suffrage was both a common and highly contested practice. Vermont ended the
practice in 1828, grandfathering in those who were already voting, and Virginia
continued to enfranchise and naturalize aliens through the 1840s.
51 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 174.
52 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, dl. 4.
53 Neuman, supra note 13, at 292-93 (citations omitted). Surely the fact that the
Constitution defined federal electors as those permitted to vote in the states
contributed to the sense that the states' definition of citizenship was primary, or at
the very least, concurrently effective with the federal power. For, if winning the right
to vote in a state assured participation in national elections, were there any political
1993] THEORETICAL MEANING OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE
It is crucial to see that the early spirit of political openness
toward aliens was perfectly compatible with the exclusionary
definition of "the American people as Christian white men of
property."54 Indeed, when properly cabined within the existing
rules of suffrage, alien voting subtly reinforced the multiple ballot
exclusions of the time. To exclude aliens from voting would have
given rise to the dangerous inference that U.S. citizenship was the
decisive criterion for suffrage at a time when the majority of U.S.
citizens, including almost all women and substantial percentages of
men without property, were categorically excluded from the
franchise.55 On the other hand, alien enfranchisement reflected
the assumption that the propertied white male alien voter would be
sufficiently similar to other electors so as not to threaten fundamen-
tal cultural and political norms.
5 6
If alien suffrage in the early years of the Republic reflected the
states' power to define their own electorates and their elevation of
rights of federal "citizenship" not obtainable in the states?
54 See generally Christopher Collier, The American People as Christian White Men of
Property: Suffrage and Elections in Colonial and Early National America, in VOTING AND
THE SPIRIT OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 19 (Donald W. Rogers ed., 1992). The states
had mostly carried over the prevailing suffrage rule in the colonies, which was that
eligible voters had to own "freeholds" worth a certain amount of money or composed
of a certain number of acres. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 7, at 12-13. This rule was
premised on the "concept that the freeholders were and should remain the backbone
of state and society because they were the repository of virtues not found in other
classes." Id. at 3; see also Linda K. Kerber, The Paradox of Women's Citizenship in the
Early Republic: The Case of Martin v. Massachusetts, 1805,97 AM. HIsT. REV. 349,349
(1992) ("The political community fashioned by the American war was a deeply
gendered one in which all white adults and a few black adults were citizens but white
men's voices were privileged.").
5' Exact figures are hard to find, but it is clear that most women and many men
were excluded from the franchise in the colonial period. Williamson states that we
"can accept as relatively correct the view that about 20 percent of the population at
that time consisted of adult males, probably a conservative estimate for newer
communities on the frontier or in western parts of the colonies." WILLIAMSON, supra
note 7, at 24. Of the white male adult population, generally 50 to 80 percent
appeared to be voters. See id. at 26-31; see also Collier, supra note 54, at 26 (noting
that while a small fraction of the citizen population voted in the colonies, the
numbers increased substantially after the Revolution).
56 Although the point should not be overstated, it is somewhat instructive as to
the original political meaning of alien suffrage that Chief Justice Taney referred
approvingly to the practice several times in the course of his white supremacist
opinion in the Dred Scott case, holding that African-Americans could never be U.S.
citizens. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. It is also worth noting in this
regard that the demise of alien suffrage took place in the early twentieth century
when larger number of immigrants came from Italian, Jewish and Mediterranean
stock.
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race, gender, and property over citizenship, the United States
Congress used alien suffrage in an instrumental way to produce
immigration in the northwest territories. In 1789, the first Congress
to convene under the Constitution reenacted the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787 to provide for the governance of the territories
northwest of the Ohio River. The Ordinance gave freehold aliens
who had been residents for two years the right to vote for represen-
tatives to territorial legislatures, and gave wealthier resident aliens
who had been residents for three years the right to serve in these
bodies.57 This remarkable willingness to welcome aliens qua aliens
into the nascent political enterprise of the new nation continued as
Congress supervised the organization of the territories and oversaw
their passage into statehood.58 In the various congressional acts
authorizing the election of representatives to statewide constitution-
al conventions in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Illinois, Congress
deliberately extended the right to vote to aliens.59 This policy
57 See Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50, 51 n.(a) (1789) (enacting, without
major changes, the Congress of the Confederation's Northwest Ordinance). Two
classes of people were given the right to hold office in the territorial legislatures:
resident owners of 200 acres of land who had been citizens of one of the United
States for three years, and aliens who owned 200 acres of land and had lived in the
territory for three years. See Neuman, supra note 13, at 295 n.235. The class of
electors consisted, similarly, of residents who owned 50 acres of land and were
citizens of one of the states, and aliens who owned 50 acres of land and had lived in
the territory for two years. See id.
The Ordinance's suffrage provisions were later adopted as part of the organic
acts of the Orleans, Michigan and Mississippi Territories. See id. at 295 n.234.
8 An interesting parallel to American willingness to enfranchise foreigners during
this period is found in the French Constitution ofJune 24,1793, which also extended
the franchise to noncitizens. See FRANK M. ANDERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONS AND
OTHER SELECTED DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF FRANCE 1789-1907,
at 171 (2d ed. 1981).
59 See Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377, 395 (1840) (noting that the
several acts of Congress regulating the territories gave aliens "the right of electing
and being elected to office"). The court stated:
It will also be further perceived, that while the right of electing and being
elected to office is conferred on persons who are neither natives nor
naturalized citizens of the United States, these same persons were permitted
to become members of the conventions which formed the constitutions of
Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois; and it is notorious that those constitu-
tions were adopted by a portion of votes given by persons who were not
citizens of the United States.
Id. The Spragins court, citing the Ohio act, held:
That all male citizens of the United States, of full age, who resided within
the territory one year previous to the day of the election, and who had paid
a territorial or county tax; and also all persons having, in other respects, the
legal qualifications to vote for representatives in the general assembly of the
1993] THEORETICAL MEANING OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE
placed its stamp on the political culture of the states that would
emerge from the territories. In 1802, for example, the new State of
Ohio enfranchised all "white male inhabitants" twenty-one years old
who had lived there for one year.
60
Although aliens thus voted freely in state, federal and territorial
elections in many places, their participation in local government was
even more common. In 1809, in Stewart v. Foster,6 1 the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court gave the basic argument for local noncitizen
voting in the course of finding that an alien freeholder, who had
lived and paid borough taxes in Pittsburgh for one year, was entitled
as a matter of state law to vote in the election of borough offi-
cers.62 As a threshold matter, the court found it dispositive that
the act incorporating Pittsburgh authorized only "citizens" to run as
candidates in most elections for local office but gave all taxpaying
male "inhabitants" the right to vote. 63 But the court went on to
emphasize that, without the state's policy of inviting immigration,
it might be forced to accept the English common law principle that
"it is as proper to exclude an alien, as a woman or an infant."6
4
But this argument, the court stated:
[I]s not so forcible here, as it would be in England, because
Pennsylvania, both under the proprietary government, and since
her independence, has held out encouragement to aliens, unknown
to the principles of the common law .... I am irresistibly led to
the conclusion, that in the view of the legislature, the peace and
prosperity of the borough were sufficiently secured, by providing
that the officers elected should be citizens, although aliens of a
certain description, who from length of residence, and payment of
taxes, might be supposed to have a common interest with the
other inhabitants, were indulged with the right of voting.
65
At the same time as the ideology of local alien suffrage was
being articulated in cases like Stewart, the War of 1812, which
produced a militant nationalism and suspicion of foreigners,
territory, were authorized to choose representative [sic] to form a conven-
tion to frame a constitution and state government.
Id. at 394 (citation omitted).
60 OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1 (1851); see also infra notes 75-82 and
accompanying text (discussing an Illinois case which held that the suffrage provision
includes aliens).
61 2 Binn. 110 (1809).
62 See id. at 118-19.
63 See id. at 117-18.
64 Id. at 118.
65 Id.
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heralded the end of the Revolutionary period of liberal attitudes
toward noncitizen voting.66 In 1812, beginning with Louisiana,
most newly admitted states, including Indiana (1816), Mississippi
(1817), Alabama (1819), Maine (1820), and Missouri (1821),
confined the franchise to citizens.67 Meanwhile, a number of early
states which had permitted alien suffrage, revoked the practice
during this same period, changing the "constitutional definition of
voters from 'inhabitants' to 'citizens. '"' 68 In addition to the effects
of the "'rise of national consciousness' engendered by the War of
1812, "69 Rosberg suggests that the turn away from alien suffrage
may have been due to "the increasing public dismay at the arrival of
large numbers of new immigrants who were not of English stock
and who were thought incapable of ready assimilation."
70
Another factor may have played a role in the eroding commit-
ment to noncitizen voting in this period. If early alien suffrage was
ideologically consistent with the property qualification, the
"agitation for the abolition of property qualifications... [, which]
began shortly after the [War of 1812] ended[,]" 71 may have under-
mined popular support for alien suffrage. The abolition of the
property qualification would have meant that, in states with alien
suffrage, all male aliens, not simply the property owners and the
wealthy, would have the right to vote. Thus, for the first time, alien
suffrage states would be extending political membership to a
different, and obviously more threatening, class of aliens-those
generally deemed unworthy of the ballot.
The new state of Illinois, which continued Congress's territorial
policy of alien suffrage, stood out as an exception to the post-War
of 1812 trend away from alien suffrage. The Illinois Constitution
brought into the franchise "all white male inhabitants above the age
of twenty-one years, having resided in the State six months."72 A
challenge to alien suffrage in Illinois in the 1840 case of Spragins v.
Houghton73 provided an opportunity for the Illinois Supreme Court
to canvass the progression of policy motivations which led first the
" See Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1096-98.
67 See id. at 1097.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 1097 (quoting ALBERTJ. MCCULLOCH, SUFFRAGE AND ITS PROBLEMS 41
(1929)).
70 Id. at 1097-98.
71 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 46.
72 ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27 (1970).
73 3 I1. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840).
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United States Congress, and then the framers of the Illinois
Constitution, to adopt alien suffrage as a constitutional impera-
tive.
74
The Spragins court found that it was "well understood" that "the
right of suffrage was extended to aliens" in the Northwest Territory
"as one strong inducement for emigration." 75 Illinois's framers
similarly believed that alien voting would help to "induce a flood of
emigration to the state, and cause its early and compact settle-
ment."
76
But the Spragins court also emphasized Congress's historic
commitment to the democratic inclusion of that "large portion of
the inhabitants of Illinois" who were emigrants from France and
Canada. 77 The court found that the framers of the Illinois Consti-
tution had pursued "the same spirit of justice and liberality" as
Congress by deliberately including all "inhabitants" in the democrat-
ic process. 78 The court then articulated a general constitutional
preference for democratic inclusion where the simple facts of
habitation, residence and common social membership establish a
political relationship "between the governed and [the] govern-
ing."79 According to the court, the Illinois Constitution:
[I]ntended to extend the right of suffrage to those who, having by
habitation and residence identified their interests and feelings with
the citizen, are upon the just principles of reciprocity between the
governed and governing, entitled to a voice in the choice of the
officers of the government, although they may be neither native
nor adopted citizens.
80
The court added: "If the right of suffrage be a natural, and not a
conventional one, there can be no just cause for abridging it, unless
by way of punishment for crime, and under very peculiar circum-
stances, and for peculiar causes."
81
74 See Spragins, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) at 402-05. The court found it indisputable, as a
matter of both textual interpretation and historical analysis, that the word "inhabit-
ants" in the Illinois Constitution's suffrage provision was designed to include aliens
and was not meant to be synonymous with "citizens." Id. at 402-05.
7- Id. at 410.
76 Id. at 398. The court noted, somewhat ironically, that this supposition's
"influence on the convention, is believed to be beyond doubt; though its effects and
influences may have failed in the extent of its anticipated operations." Id.
71 Id. at 397.
78 Id.
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In the course of explaining these constitutional choices for alien
suffrage, the court invoked the theme of local state citizenship,
finding that references in the Illinois Constitution to "citizens" did
not change the inclusive meaning of "inhabitants" in the electoral
provision. The Court stated: "Now, a person may be, in the
ordinary sense of the term, a citizen of this state, but still not a
citizen of the United States."
8 2
B. Expansion Westward and the Wisconsin Solution
Illinois' democratic argument for alien suffrage attracted no new
adherents until Wisconsin's admission to the Union in 1848 revived
and transformed the practice of alien suffrage. The framers of
Wisconsin's Constitution adopted a modified form of alien suffrage,
extending full voting rights only to so-called "declarant aliens"-
"[those] White persons of foreign birth who shall have declared
their intention to become citizens, conformably to the laws of the
United States on the subject of naturalization." As Neuman notes,
this provision took advantage of federal naturalization law, which
since 1795 had required aliens seeking citizenship to "first declare
under oath to a competent court their intention to apply subse-
quently for citizenship (known colloquially as 'taking out first
papers'), and had postponed eligibility for actual naturalization
('second' or 'final papers') until three years after the declara-
tion."8 3 Neuman observes that such declaration, under federal
law, did not deprive the alien of his original nationality, did not
legally obligate him to complete the process of becoming a citizen,
and did not even require an oath of allegiance to the United
States.8 4 The Wisconsin plan would later come under attack for
these reasons.
85
82 Id. at 407.
83 Neuman, supra note 13, at 297.
84 See id.
85 In 1918, Kirk Porter, a suffrage historian, ridiculed the Wisconsin declarant
alien suffrage provision:
The alien is still an alien in every sense of the word until he is naturalized,
and his declaration of intention does not make him partially naturalized
.... Men who favored admitting aliens to the suffrage after they had
declared their intention labored under all sorts of delusions .... So here
was Wisconsin admitting the subjects of the British king and the king of
Prussia to the ballot box to help elect a president of the United States.
PORTER, supra note 6, at 119-20.
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Nonetheless, the declarant alien qualification succeeded in
weakening the force of nationalist opposition to alien suffrage by
recasting the practice of alien suffrage. It now became, much more
clearly, a pathway to citizenship rather than a possible substitute for
it: noncitizen voting became pre-citizen voting. Thus, declarant
aliens in Wisconsin, those presumably on the "citizenship track,"
86
won the right to participate in local, state, and national elections.
The Wisconsin formula of enfranchising aliens, but only those
who had declared their intention to become citizens, proved
popular as the country continued to push westward in the nine-
teenth century. The desire for immigration carried noncitizen
voting along.87 Less than three months after Wisconsin's admis-
sion, Congress passed an organic act for the Oregon Territory which
embodied the same terms on alien voting.88  It was followed in
1849 by a parallel provision in the organic act for the Territory of
Minnesota.8 9 Although Congress did not extend voting rights to
aliens in the territories of Utah, New Mexico, and California (lands
won during the Mexican War), it did include provisions for
declarant alien suffrage in the enabling acts of the territories of
Washington, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, Dakota, Wyoming, and
However, Porter preserved sufficient academic composure to note that:
"Although the situation has always been anomalous, it has been unquestionably
constitutional." Id. at 121.
86 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1110.
87 See PORTER, supra note 6, at 113. Porter noted:
For the first time the alien found strong champions; for the first time
he was really wanted in certain parts of the country, wanted so badly that
inducements were held out to attract him. Up in the Great Lakes region-in
Michigan, Indiana, Wisconsin, Illinois, and Minnesota-there were vast,
uncultivated tracts of land awaiting exploitation. Most of these states had
not been organized very many years and they were eager to grow, to
develop their resources, increase their population and their wealth, gain
larger representation in Congress, and become important units in the
national government. What then could be more logical than to offer the
swarming immigrants a hand in the government if they would only come?
And a hand in the government meant the right of suffrage even before they
were naturalized.
Id.
Porter points out that the influx of immigrants also provoked a backlash,
symbolized by the famous Know-Nothing Convention in Philadelphia in September
of 1847. See id. at 115 (pointing out, somewhat dubiously, that "the opposition to
foreigners exercising the right of suffrage reached its highest point in this party,
which maintained an organization until the Civil War").
88 See Oregon Territorial Government Act, ch. 177, § 5, 9 Stat. 323, 325 (1848).
89 See Minnesota Territorial Governmental Act, ch. 121, § 5, 9 Stat. 403, 405
(1849).
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Oklahoma. 90 After achieving statehood, some of these territories
preserved the practice of declarant alien suffrage in their state
constitutions; others decided to abandon the practice entirely; and
a few dropped it but made provisions for grandfathering in
noncitizens who were already voting.
9 1
In 1850, the delegates to the Michigan state constitutional
convention replaced a rather strict citizenship requirement from the
1835 constitution with an amendment which extended the vote to
all declarant aliens living in the state for half the federal naturaliza-
tion waiting period. 92 A delegate from Detroit, J.H. Bagg, gave a
rousing speech on behalf of this measure.93 Bagg linked alien
suffrage to both democratic and Democratic politics, including his
party's attack on "the odious property qualification." Stating his
own preference for declarant alien suffrage after only one year's
residence, he remarked:
I shall now vote for this section or amendment, and if not
successful, for the next most liberal which shall be offered. The
progressive spirit of the age requires it,-the progressive spirit of the
democratic party requires it,-the democracy of this State requires it, and
they must have it .... The Peninsular State is yet the banner State of
democracy. This convention is a democratic convention. On us and
90 See Neuman, supra note 13, at 298 (noting that in "all nine of these territories,
Congress imposed the additional requirement of an oath to support the U.S.
Constitution").
91 The state constitutions of Minnesota (1857), Oregon (1857), Kansas (1859),
Nebraska (1867), North Dakota (1889), and South Dakota (1889) all included
declarant noncitizen suffrage, while the constitutions of Nevada (1864), Wyoming
(1889), and Oklahoma (1907) rejected it. See Neuman, supra note 13, at 299 n.254
("Montana and Washington limited their prospective enfranchisement to citizens
while grandfathering in declarant aliens.").
92 The 1835 provision enfranchised all white men living in Michigan at the time
that the constitution was signed. But, after that date, only white male U.S. citizens
who had lived in the state for six months were entitled to vote. Naturalized citizens
had to have lived in the country for five years and in Michigan for one year. See
Henry A. Chaney, Alien Suffrage, 1 MICH. POL. SCI. ASS'N 130-39 (1894).
93 See id. at 131-34.
[At the time of the War of 1812], sir, an alien had to undergo a
probationary state of 21 years before he could become a citizen of these
United States. Now it is different. How has this been brought about? Sir,
the Democratic party, the party of progress and of equal rights, believing
that democracy was confined to no geographic lines, that no man was
consulted as to the location of his birth, determined to get rid of these
aristocratic features of our Constitution, which smacked too much of the
relics of monarchy, of Great Britain, whose yoke we had just thrown off
Id. at 132.
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us alone rests the responsibility of making a democratic constitu-
tion.
94
C. From the Civil War to World War I: The Expansion
and Contraction of Alien Suffrage
During the period of the 1850s and 1860s, alien suffrage played
a growing role in the struggle between north and south, with
southerners trying to reduce and northerners trying to expand the
political influence of immigrants, who were overwhelmingly hostile
to slavery (if not necessarily friendly to blacks).95 The issue of
noncitizen voting became a bone of contention in congressional
debate over the laws governing new territories and states. During
Senate consideration of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, an amendment
was offered to forbid noncitizen voting in the new territories.
Pennsylvania Senator Brodhead stated that "I do not feel at liberty
to go further than the people of my own state have gone in their
Constitution. My state confines the right of voting to citizens of the
United States." 9 6 Although, the debate concluded with Congress
deciding not to limit the vote to citizens, it flared up again when
Congress considered the Minnesota Statehood Enabling act.
97
After the Civil War began, the Union's military manpower needs
caused the armed forces to turn to aliens for help,98 and the
94 Id. at 133.
95 See EUGENE C. MURDOCK, ONE MILLION MEN: THE CIVIL WAR DRAFT IN THE
NORTH 306 (1971) ("Probably a majority of every nationality group-even the Irish-
did favor the Union."); see also Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1116-17 ("'[N]o matter how
ignorant and stupid the immigrant might be, he was more than likely to be sure of
one thing-that he did not believe in holding slaves. He could not discuss states'
rights, theories of sovereignty, and nullification, but he was unequivocally opposed
to the slaveholder.'" (quoting PORTER, supra note 6, at 3)); id. ("'South Carolina and
Georgia want people much but they fear the migrations, and will check them rather
than run the chance of importing people who may be averse to slavery.'" (quoting
Congressman King's remark)). Of course, many immigrants were also hostile later
to the injustices of the Union draft during the Civil War, and terrible anti-draft
rioting broke out in many larger cities, including New York, in 1863. SeeJOHN W.
CHAMBERS II, To RAISE AN ARMY: THE DRAFT COMES TO MODERN AMERICA 53-54
(1987).
96 Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. 809 (1857) (remarks of Sen. Brodhead of
Pennsylvania).
97 See Neuman, supra note 13, at 298-99. The Senate, motivated by southern
suspicion of anti-slavery sentiment among immigrants, adopted the Clayton
amendment, which would have limited the franchise in the new territories' first
elections to citizens only. But the House of Representatives wanted to open elections
in the new territories to aliens, and the House prevailed.98 See MURDOCK, supra note 95, at 305-32; see also ROBERT L. PETERSON &JOHN
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"foreign-born" came to constitute "nearly 25 percent of the Union
Army."99 Not all alien soldiers were there voluntarily. In con-
fronting the thorny question of aliens and conscription, the
government gradually chose voting as the crucial dividing line
between draftable and undraftable aliens. On July 17, 1862,
Congress passed the Militia Act, which called for the nine-month
enrollment of "all able-bodied male citizens between the ages of 18
and 45, to be apportioned among the States according to represen-
tative population." °' ° The Act empowered the President "to draft
citizens into the state militia if that state failed to fill its quota
through voluntarism."1 0 1 In August, Wisconsin Governor Edward
Salomon wrote to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, informing
him that approximately half of his state's able-bodied men were
aliens, but pointing out that they had already declared their
intentions to become citizens and were eligible to vote. Governor
Salomon urged that these men not be exempted from the
draft.10 2 In his answer, Stanton took the position that the mere
declaration of intent to become a citizen did not subject these men
to the draft but that declarant aliens who had in fact voted would be
draftable. 10
3
One such man was Carl Wehlitz, an alien from Prussia living in
Milwaukee, who had declared his intention to become a U.S. citizen
and had exercised his right to vote. 104 After he was drafted under
Stanton's interpretation of the Militia Act, Wehlitz challenged his
conscription in court, arguing that, on its terms, the Militia Act
A. HUDSON, FOREIGN RECRUITMENT FOR UNION FORCES, CIVIL WAR HISTORY 176-89
(1961). On the North's constant search for military manpower during the Civil War
and the history of conscription during this period, see generally CHAMBERS, supra
note 95, at 47-58 (describing the events leading up to conscription during the Civil
War);JAMEs W. GEARY, WE NEED MEN: THE UNION DRAFT IN THE CIVIL WAR (1991)
(same); EUGENE C. MURDOCK, PATRIOTISM LIMITED 1862-1865: THE CIVIL WAR
DRAFT AND THE BOUNTY SYSTEM (1967) (same).
99 CHAMBERS, supra note 95, at 49.
1°° JOSEPH C. DUGGAN, THE LEGISLATIVE AND STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FEDERAL CONCEPT OF CONSCRIPTION FOR MILITARY SERVICE 22 (1946).
101 CHAMBERS, supra note 95, at 48.
102 See MURDOCK, supra note 95, at 308. Murdock points out that later in the fall,
aliens were drafted in Cleveland, Ohio, which led to a controversy over whether they
could be released upon habeas corpus, which had been suspended in military cases by
President Lincoln. See id. Governor David Tod tried to prevail upon Secretary
Stanton "to instruct commanders of all rendezvous camps to release men claiming
alienage and thus avoid a confrontation between civil and military officers." Id.
103 See id.
104 See In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 468, 468-69 (1863).
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applied only to "citizens" and, as a legal alien, he was therefore not
draftable.
10 5
In January of 1863, the Wisconsin Supreme Court unanimously
rejected Wehlitz' claim. 10 6 Justice Paine noted that a system of
bifurcated citizenship is inevitable in federalism:
Under our complex system of government there may be a citizen
of a state who is not a citizen of the United States in the full sense
of the term. This result would seem to follow unavoidably from
the nature of the two systems of government.
10 7
After finding that the word "citizens" as used by Congress could
apply to both U.S.-defined citizens and state-defined citizens,Justice
Paine turned to the question of whether declarant aliens who had
exercised the right to vote in Wisconsin were in fact citizens of the
state. He acknowledged that:
It may be possible for the state to confer the right of voting on
certain persons without making them citizens, yet I should think
it would require very strong evidence of a contrary intention to
overcome the inference of an intention to create a citizenship
when the right of suffrage is conferred. 108
105 See id. at 469-70.
'06 See id. at 480.
107 Id. at 470-71. Justice Paine found definitive support for this point in the then
recent U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v. Sandford. See id. at 470-72.
Justice Paine wrote:
"The [C]onstitution has conferred on [Clongress the right to establish an
uniform rule of naturalization, and this right is evidently exclusive, and has
always been held by this court to be so; consequently, no state, since the
adoption of the [C]onstitution, can, by naturalizing an alien, invest him with
the rights and privileges secured to a citizen of a state under the federal
government, although so far as the state alone was concerned he would
undoubtedly be entitled to the rights of a citizen, and clothed with all the rights and
immunities which the [Clonstitution and laws of the state attached to that
character."
Id. at 472 (quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405-06 (1856)
(alteration in original)). This point has long been well-accepted by the states. See e.g.,
Leche v. Fowler, 6 So. 602, 602 (La. 1889) ("But a person may be a citizen of a
particular state and not a citizen of the United States. To hold otherwise would be
to deny to the state the highest exercise of its sovereignty .... ").
108 In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. at 473. The Court then drew upon Justice Curtis's
dissenting opinion in Dred Scott: "But further, though as I shall presently more fully
state, I do not think the enjoyment of the elective franchise essential to citizenship,
there can be no doubt it is one of the chiefest attributes of citizenship .... " Id.
(quoting Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 581 (Curtis, J., dissenting)).
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In a political sense, he argued, "the word citizen implies the
possession of political rights."
1 °9
Justice Paine then found that "there is no room for doubt that
it was the intention to confer upon [declarant aliens who had voted]
the full rights of state citizenship."1 1 Aliens had not only been
included in the state constitutional drafting process but were
granted the right to vote and run for most public offices by the
Wisconsin Constitution.1 1 1 If the right to participate in politics
does "not indicate an intention to create them citizens of the state,"
Justice Paine observed, "it is difficult to imagine from what such an
intention could be inferred." 112 Thus, he concluded, "[if] the
liability of this petitioner to be drafted depended upon the meaning
of the word 'citizen' in our state law, I should have no hesitation in
saying that he was liable." 113 Justice Paine closed his opinion by
reiterating his belief in the mutual ties which knit together all voting
citizens of Wisconsin, including those deemed to be "aliens."
114
The inadequacies of the Militia Act 115 eventually led Congress
109 Id. at 473.
110 Id. at 474.
11 See id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 477. On the question of Congressional intent, Justice Paine found that
"citizen" in the draft law ofJuly 17,1862 was intended to incorporate state definitions
of who the citizens were. See id. at 479-80. He supported this conclusion by noting
that Congress had enacted another statute providing for immediate naturalization of
alien volunteers upon an honorable discharge after the war. See id. at 479-80. Justice
Paine then asked rhetorically:
Can it be possible, that [C]ongress, anxious to fill the armies of the Union,
and while passing one act to induce entire aliens, who had never declared
their intentions at all, to enlist, intended, in another act passed at the same
time, to exclude from liability to military duty, by the use of the word
'citizen,' those who had ... become citizens of the state, and taken a part
in the election of the highest officers of the United States?
Id. at 480.
114 See id. at 480-81. Justice Paine noted:
[Aliens] have enjoyed the privileges and protection of citizens; they have
filled the offices, taken part in the enactment of state laws, and had an equal
voice with others in the election of the officers and the enactment of the
laws of the United States. They have found free homes among us, under
our government established upon the principles of civil and religious liberty
and equality of rights among men. They have shared our prosperity when
we were prosperous and happy, and, by every principle ofjustice and every
sentiment of honor, they ought to share the burdens in this hour of calamity
and trial.
Id.
"5 See generally DUGGAN, supra note 100, at 20-23 (describing the history leading
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to pass the Enrolment Act of March 3, 1863.116 This Act, often
described as the first precedent for the modern selective service sys-
tem,11 7 included in the draft males between the ages of twenty
and forty-five "of foreign birth who shall have declared on oath their
intention to become citizens."11 Suddenly, many aliens who had
declared their intentions to become citizens now wanted to
renounce their plans. 119 On May 8, 1863 President Lincoln
issued a proclamation giving such persons sixty-five days to exit the
country or, at the lapse of this period, face the draft.120 Signifi-
cantly, however, all declarant aliens who had already voted were
excluded from this offer and could not renounce their declarations
of intent.121 Thus, any alien who had voted in the United States
was subject to the draft immediately, along with U.S. citizens.
Aliens trying to escape military service were required to appear
before their draft enrollment boards and show "that they had never
voted in this country."
122
While the North mobilized aliens to fight for the Union at the
outset of the war, southern opposition to alien suffrage deepened.
Delegates to the Confederate constitutional convention in Mont-
gomery, Alabama in 1861 chose to do what the original American
Founders had not: ban alien voting as a matter of constitutional
law. 123 Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution of the Confederate
States, which describes the powers and duties of the House of
Representatives, follows precisely the parallel provisions in the
United States Constitution except that it explicitly confines the
franchise to citizens:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members
chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and
the electors in each State shall be citizens of the Confederate States, and
up to Militia Act).
116 Enrolment Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 731 (1863).
117 See DUGGAN, supra note 100, at 23.
118 MURDOCK, supra note 95, at 308 (quoting Enrolment Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. at
731).
119 See id. at 309.
120 See id.
121 See id.
122 Id. In Massachusetts, Provost Marshal Samuel Stone, responsible for
administering the draft in the Eighth District, required every alien claiming
exemption from the draft "to present a certificate from his town or city clerk showing
that he had never voted or claimed the right to vote." Id. at 312.
123 See MARSHALL L. DEROSA, THE CONFEDERATE CONSTITUTION OF 1861, at 73-75
(1991).
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have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous
branch of the State Legislature; but no person offoreign birth, not a
citizen of the Confederate States, shall be allowed to vote for any officer,
civil or politica State or Federal
124
The two italicized passages appear to be legally redundant, but the
first was probably intended to make clear that Northerners were
excluded from participation in Confederate elections, while the
latter was evidently designed to disenfranchise non-American
foreigners resident in Confederate states. It is ironic that the
Confederacy, which was conceived ideologically in opposition to
federal control over state affairs, constitutionally foreclosed the
option of alien suffrage to the states and localities.
After the Civil War, noncitizen voting recaptured its lost ground
as an electoral practice. At least thirteen new states adopted
declarant alien suffrage, "all of them in the South or West and all
of them evidently anxious to lure new settlers."125 A number of
the former Confederate states formed part of this trend as the
Reconstruction governments of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, South
Carolina, and Texas included provisions for declarant alien suffrage
in their Constitutions. 126 There are a number of plausible expla-
nations for this phenomenon which await treatment by a historian
to determine their relative weight. Some of the southern states may
have been motivated by the progressive attitudes of Reconstruction
and a corresponding eagerness to inject new blood into the post-
slavery South. This desire to encourage immigration would have
constituted a fairly typical motivation for alien suffrage, although
designed more for political than economic purposes.
A second and related possibility is that it was seen as only fair
to grant the vote to white male aliens, many of whom had fought
for, and indeed been drafted by, the North during the Civil
War.127 Shklar explains that suffrage history is repeatedly marked
124 CONFEDERATE CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 1 (1861) (emphasis added). I am indebted
to Gerald Neuman for directing me to this fascinating point about the Confederate
Constitution.
125 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1099. Unfortunately, the historical record is
somewhat spotty and inscrutable. No general history of noncitizen voting has ever
been written, and as Rosberg points out, not all original sources are completely
trustworthy. Furthermore, "[flew of the commentators make an effort to identify the
particular states that allowed aliens to vote." Id. at n.36. Rosberg also points out that
some states may have enacted a state statute, as opposed to a constitutional provision,
that granted aliens the right to vote. See id.
126 See Neuman, supra note 13, at 299 & n.258.
127 One federal statute had already been interpreted as granting citizenship to
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by returning soldiers demanding and obtaining the right to vote as
the just reward for their services and "the most basic and character-
istic political act of the citizen-soldier."128  Surely this logic,
operating fiercely at the time with regard to blacks, did not escape
the notice of alien veterans, who had fought for the blacks'
freedom. 129 Finally, a more sobering interpretation of the move
to alien suffrage is that the South had a great need to attract a
cheap immigrant labor force in the wake of slavery's abolition.
130
At any rate, the spread of noncitizen voting after the Civil War
renewed the vitality of the practice. In 1894, a political scientist
hostile to alien voting attributed recent statewide election results in
Wisconsin and Illinois to "the weight of a foreign element"3 1 and
also described foreign newcomers as the heart of the Tammany
political machine which "names a president, and in some degree
controls an administration." 13 2 By the time the nineteenth centu-
ry came to a close, according to Rosberg, "nearly one-half of the
states and territories had some experience with voting by aliens, and
for some the experience lasted more than half a century."
133
The late nineteenth century revival of alien suffrage, launched
by Wisconsin and accelerated by the defeat of the Confederacy,
came to a halt at the turn of the twentieth century, when anti-
immigration feeling ran very high. Alabama stopped allowing aliens
to vote by way of a constitutional change in 1901, followed by
Colorado in 1902, Wisconsin in 1908, and Oregon in 1914.134
aliens who had volunteered for service and received honorable discharges without
requiring any previous declaration of intention or previous residence of more than
one ear. See In re Wehlitz, 16 Wis. 468, 480 (1863).
1 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 45.
129 Id. at 52. Shklar noted:
The black man could, moreover, now claim to be a genuine citizen-soldier
after his services in the Civil War. "'It is dangerous to deny any class of
people the right to vote. But the black man deserves the right to vote for
what he has done, to aid in suppressing the rebellion, both by fighting and
by assisting the Federal soldier wherever he was found. He deserves to vote
because his services may be needed again,' noted Douglass. 'If he knows
enough to shoulder a musket and to fight for the flag, fight for the
government, he knows enough to vote.'"
Id. (quoting Frederick Douglass) (footnote omitted).
[ 0 For a more complete discussion of the economic needs of the South, see
generally, FONER, supra note 11, at 124-75.
131 Chaney, supra note 92, at 136.
132 Id. at 137.
l33 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1099.
IN See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 115.
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"With the quickening tempo of war, the enlightened tactic of
education for immigrants steadily gave way to the harsh technique
of repression." 13 5 The demise of alien suffrage was hastened by
the "frantic and overreactive days of the First World War when
attitudes of parochialism and fear of the foreigner were the order
of the day." i3 6 Just as the nationalism unleashed by the War of
1812 helped to reverse the alien suffrage policies inherited from the
late eighteenth century, the hysteria attending World War I caused
a sweeping retreat from the progressive alien suffrage policies of the
late nineteenth century.
137
In 1918, Kansas, Nebraska, and South Dakota all changed their
constitutions to purge alien suffrage, and Texas ended the practice
of noncitizen voting in primary elections by statute.138 These
changes apparently came on the heels of great and, as one observer
remarked wryly, quite belated agitation in the press about the
horrors of aliens voting.139 The momentum for cleansing state
law of alien suffrage provisions continued as Indiana and Texas
joined the trend in 1921, followed by Mississippi in 1924 and,
finally, Arkansas in 1926.140 In 1931, a political scientist noted:
"For the first time in over a hundred years, a national election was
held in 1928 in which no alien in any state had the right to cast a
135 DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY 66 (1980).
136 Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 82 (1979) (Blackmun,J. dissenting) (holding
that a New York statute forbidding permanent certification as a public school teacher
for noncitizens who have not manifested an intention to apply for citizenship does
not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
137 SeeJOHN BRAEMAN ET AL., CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICA: THE 1920s, at 229 (1968) (discussing the post-World War I anti-immigrant
frenzy). "Such was the peril, it was not enough to bar future immigration or patiently
instruct foreigners in the meaning of Americanism. Heroic surgery was immediately
required to cut out the cancerous growth. The 'Great Red Scare' was a time of
unparalleled intimidation, suppression, imprisonment, deportation-at the local, state,
and federal level .... " Id. Aliens were also special targets of the so-called Palmer
raids in 1920, when Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer conducted an indiscriminate
nationwide round-up of more than 4,000 suspected radicals, hundreds of whom were
deported. See RONALD SANDERS, SHORES OF REFUGE 380 (1988) (chronicling the fear
of Communist infiltration and other post-WWI concerns leading to restrictions).
138 See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 115.
139 See PORTER, supra note 6, at 121 n.1 ("The press in various parts of the country
has become excited over this situation at the present time (February, 1918), and many
people seem to think that a startling discovery has been made, for aliens can now vote
in seven states of the Union. Certainly it cannot be considered a novel situation, for
aliens have voted for congressmen somewhere in the United States for seventy
years.").
140 See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 115-16.
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vote for a candidate for any office-national, state, or local."
141
Alien suffrage was pronounced dead and forever lost to our polity:
"Because of a reversal of opinion by the state supreme court, alien
suffrage in Arkansas became illegal in 1926, and the last vestige of
this political anomaly passed from our election system, doubtless
never to return."142
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PERMISSION FOR NONCITIZEN VOTING
During the long history of alien suffrage, neither the Supreme
Court nor any lower federal court or state court ever found the
practice unconstitutional. On the contrary, numerous state courts
explicitly or implicitly endorsed noncitizen voting.143 Although
the Supreme Court was never forced to decide the issue directly, it
explicitly and repeatedly signalled its acceptance of the practice.
The Court made its first declaration on the subject in the infamous
Dred Scott case in the course of distinguishing between "the rights of
citizenship which a State may confer within its own limits, and the
rights of citizenship as a member of the Union." 144 The Court
stated that "[e]ach State may still confer [all the rights and privileges
of the citizen of a State] upon an alien, or any one it thinks proper,
or upon any class or description of persons; yet he would not be a
citizen in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution
of the United States." 145 And, again, later the Court noted that
"in some of the States of the Union foreigners not naturalized are
allowed to vote."
146
The Court's observations about the permissibility of alien voting
survived the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment even if its
central holding-that African-Americans could not be "citizens"
within the meaning of the federal Constitution-did not. In 1874,
the Court in Minor v. Happersettl47 cited the practice of noncitizen
voting for the proposition that citizenship and suffrage are
independent legal categories which do not necessarily imply one
another.
148
141 Id. at 114.
142 Id.
143 See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
144 Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 405 (1856).
145 Id.
146 Id. at 422.
147 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
14 In Minor, a native-born white woman resident in the state of Missouri, argued
that the disenfranchisement of women by Missouri's Constitution violated the
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In Minor, the Court rejected a woman's claim that Missouri's
exclusion of women from the franchise violated her Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection rights as a citizen of the state and the
United States. The Court found that voting was never a necessary
incident of citizenship and that "the Constitution has not added the
right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as
they existed at the time it was adopted." 149  Canvassing the
history of wealth, income, gender, property, race, age, and residency
qualifications, Chief Justice Waite, writing for a unanimous court,
found it incontrovertible that "all the citizens of the States were not
invested with the right of suffrage." 150 He then made the obverse
point that, if in fact not all citizens were voters, neither were all
voters citizens:
Besides this, citizenship has not in all cases been made a condition
precedent to the enjoyment of the right of suffrage. Thus, in
Missouri, persons of foreign birth, who have declared their
intention to become citizens of the United States, may under
certain circumstances vote. The same provision is to be foundin
Fourteenth Amendment by abridging the privileges and immunities attendant to her
citizenship. See Minor, 88 U.S. at 165. The Supreme Court readily acknowledged that
"women have always been considered as citizens the same as men" and stated that
Minor's citizenship preceded and, therefore, did not depend upon ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment in 1867. See id. at 169-70. The real question, the Court
stated, was therefore not whether a woman is a United States citizen but whether "the
right of suffrage is one of the necessary privileges of a citizen of the United States."
Id. at 170. To this question, the Court first found that the Fourteenth Amendment
had added no new "privileges and immunities" to the rights of the citizenry. Id. at
171. It then canvassed the history of state suffrage at the time the Constitution was
adopted and determined that many full-fledged citizens were excluded from voting
by virtue of gender, property, age, wealth, income, and residency qualifications. See
id. at 172-73. The Court contended further that, if suffrage were a privilege and
immunity of citizenship, the Fifteenth Amendment guarantee that citizens would not
be denied the right to vote on account of race would be completely redundant and
unnecessary. See id. at 175. In adducing further evidence for its position that
citizenship and suffrage are not necessary complements, the Court then invoked the
history of alien suffrage. See id. at 176-78.
The Court obviously begged the question of whether a state could, consistent
with the Fourteenth Amendment, extend the privilege of voting to male citizens but
not female citizens. It was not a Supreme Court decision but rather the Nineteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1920, which overturned the Court's
formalistic and tautological approach to the exclusion of women from suffrage. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XIX, §1 ("The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall
not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of sex.").
149 Minor, 88 U.S. at 171.
"o Id. at 176.
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the constitutions of Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Indiana,
Kansas, Minnesota, and Texas.
151
Thus, more than one hundred years ago, in the context of wide-
spread alien voting, the Supreme Court clearly indicated its
approval of the practice.
This passage was no lone shot in the dark. In 1904, the
Supreme Court briefly revisited the topic of noncitizen voting and
gave an even more explicit endorsement of its constitutionality.
The occasion was the case of Pope v. Williams,15 2 which upheld,
against equal protection and general constitutional attacks, a
Maryland statute requiring new residents to make a declaration of
intent to become Maryland citizens one year before registering to
vote.153 In the course of emphasizing that "the privilege to vote
in a State is within the jurisdiction of the State itself, to be exercised
as the State may direct, and upon such terms as to it may seem
proper, provided, of course, no discrimination is made between
individuals in violation of the Federal Constitution," 154 Justice
Peckham observed: "The State might provide that persons of
foreign birth could vote without being naturalized, and, as stated by
Mr. Chief Justice Waite in Minor v. Happersett, such persons were
allowed to vote in several of the States upon having declared their
intentions to become citizens of the United States." 155 As recent-
ly as 1973, the Supreme Court has remarked that "citizenship is a
permissible criterion" for limiting voting rights, and thus, implicitly,
not a compulsory one.
156
The Supreme Court's periodic remarks assuming the legitimacy
of alien suffrage reflect a proper reading of the constitutional
regime governing elections. The Constitution prescribes no specific
qualifications for voting in state elections and simply borrows from
state-created suffrage qualifications to define the federal electorate.
Article I, Section 2 provides that members of the House of
Representatives shall be chosen "by the People of the several States,
and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite
for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legisla-
151 Id. at 177.
152 193 U.S. 621 (1904).
153 See id. at 632.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 632-33.
156 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (striking down, on equal
protection grounds, a complete ban on aliens working in the New York Civil Service)
(emphasis added).
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ture." 157 The Seventeenth Amendment similarly provides that
United States Senators shall be elected "by the people" of the states
and that the "electors in each State shall have the qualifications
requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State
legislatures." 158  As the Supreme Court stated in Minor. "The
United States has no voters in the States of its own creation. The
elective officers of the United States are all elected directly or
indirectly by State voters." 159 The states have accordingly fixed
the qualifications for voting,160 and noncitizens enfranchised at
the state level in earlier times were also thereby permitted to vote
for U.S. Representatives, Senators, and Presidents in national elec-
tions.
161
The argument that the Constitution does not forbid noncitizen
suffrage is bolstered by the Constitutional architecture governing
the election of federal officers. In designing requirements for
holding federal office, the Framers showed that they knew how to
impose U.S. citizenship as a condition for political participation
when they wanted to. The Constitution provides that: "No Person
except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at
the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the
Office of President .... " 162 This stringent citizenship require-
ment was loosened a bit for members of the House of Representa-
tives, each of whom, it was decided, must be for "seven Years a
Citizen of the United States," 163 and U.S. Senators, each of whom
must be "nine Years a Citizen of the United States." 164 It can be
safely concluded from the juxtaposition of the Framers' specific and
157 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1.
158 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
159 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 170 (1874).
160 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959)
("The States have long been held to have broad powers to determine the conditions
under which the right of suffrage may be exercised .... "). Today, of course, it is
well accepted that "the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections."
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970) (footnote omitted). See also Carring-
ton v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (holding that a state can impose reasonable residence
requirements for voting, but it cannot, under the Equal Protection Clause, deny the
ballot to a member of the armed services); THE FEDERALIST No. 52 (James Madison)
(discussing in part the need for states to determine the right of their respective
inhabitants to suffrage independently of each other).
161 See Aylsworth, supra note 36, at 114-16.
162 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cI. 5.
163 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
,64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3.
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varying constitutional conditions for federal office-holding and their
complete silence as to a citizenship qualification for federal voting
that they did not intend to create a U.S. citizenship suffrage qualifi-
cation.
Given the permission for noncitizen voting implicit in the
Constitutional provisions governing elections, it is necessary to
question whether any other Constitutional provisions implicitly
impose limits on the practice. Specifically, we must ask whether
alien suffrage is consistent with the principles of republicanism and
one person-one vote, 165 the various suffrage amendments, 166
and the Naturalization Clause.
1 67
A. Principles of Republicanism and Equal Voting Weight
There is, no doubt, an argument to be had about whether
noncitizen voting is consistent with republican theory, but the
practice does not offend the Republican Guaranty Clause. Since its
seminal 1849 decision in Luther v. Borden,168 the Supreme Court
has consistently found that the republicanism of a state government,
institution, or practice is a non-justiciable political question reserved
to Congress, or that the challenged practice is not, on its merits,
offensive to the Guaranty Clause.1 69 In Luther, the court refused
165 Relevant provisions are the Republican Guaranty Clause, whose significance
is minimal; Article I, Section 2, which has been read to establish the principle of one
person-one vote in Congressional elections; and the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, which requires one person-one vote principles in state legislative
elections. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 4; U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend,
XIV.
166 The Fifteenth Amendment forbids suffrage discrimination "by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. The Nineteenth Amendment forbids suffrage
discrimination "by the United States or by any State on account of sex." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIX, § 1. The Twenty-Fourth Amendment forbids suffrage discrimination "by
the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV, § 1. The Twenty-Sixth Amendment secures the right to
vote for all citizens who "are eighteen years of age or older" against federal or state
denial or abridgement "on account of age." U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, § 1.
167 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
'" 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
169 As the Court stated:
If the legislature of the State has the power to create and alter school
districts and divide and apportion the property of such districts ... the
action of the legislature [in combining preexisting local school districts into
a single district] is compatible with a republican form of government even
if it be admitted that section 4, Article IV, of the Constitution applies to the
creation of, or the powers or rights of property of, the subordinate
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to designate, between the competing incumbent and insurgent
regimes of Rhode Island, which was the sovereign republican
government, stating that the Guaranty Clause left such a task to
Congress only. 170 The Court also found that the incumbent
government's declaration of martial law, though justiciable, did not
offend the Guaranty Clause. 17 1 The Court has since refrained
from striking down specific governmental practices alleged to
deprive citizens of their right to a republican form of govern-
ment.172 There is no reason to think that the federal courts
would break from this solid line of precedent to find that the
institution of noncitizen voting by a state violates the Guaranty
Clause. 173 This is an especially compelling conclusion given the
municipalities of a State.
Attorney Gen. of Michigan v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905); see also Forsyth v.
Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 520 (1897); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
170 See Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 42.
171 See id. at 43.
172 In 1897, the Court found that state legislative (as opposed to the challenged
state judicial) control over the territorial boundaries of a municipal corporation "is
not one of the essential elements of a republican form of government which, under
section 4 of Article 4 of the Constitution, the United States are bound to guarantee
to every State in this Union." Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897). In
1912, the Court rejected a challenge by a corporation to Oregon's initiative and
referendum law, by which certain corporate taxes were imposed. See Pacific States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). The plaintiff argued that the
initiative law and the tax measure passed under it "violate the right to a republican
form of government which is guaranteed by § 4 of Art. IV of the Federal Constitu-
tion." Id. at 120-21. The Court held that the matter of whether the popular initiative
was a "republican" institution was for Congress to decide. See id. at 149-51. The
Court stated it could not simply:
substitute its judgment as to a matter purely political for the judgment of
Congress on a subject committed to it and thus overthrow the Constitution
upon the ground that thereby the guarantee to the States of a government
republican in form may be secured, a conception which after all rests upon
the assumption that the States are to be guaranteed a government
republican in form by destroying the very existence of a government
republican in form in the Nation.
Id. at 142.
173 But see Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 721 (1868) (defining a state
generally as "a political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined
boundaries, and organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written
constitution, and established by the consent of the governed."), rev'd on other grounds,
Morgan v. United States, 113 U.S. 476 (1885). It is highly doubtful that this general
language, not directed at the question of alien suffrage, would be controlling. At any
rate, the word "citizens" here may have an ambiguous meaning, referring not
necessarily to U.S. citizens, but citizens of the states.
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mainstream history of alien suffrage and the significant role
Congress played in spreading the practice.
174
Alien suffrage also does not offend the basic republican
principle of one person-one vote because aliens can be persons
within the meaning of this formulation. If the requirement of one
person-one vote, which was extended to local government elections
in Avery v. Midland,175 meant one citizen-one vote, then noncitizen
suffrage would unlawfully dilute the value of citizen votes.176 But
the Supreme Court has nowhere adopted one citizen-one vote as the
constitutional standard, and it is hard to argue that it has done so
implicitly.
In Reynolds v. Sims,177 the Supreme Court found that the Four-
teenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause "guarantees the
opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election of
state legislators," 178 and struck down an Alabama reapportion-
ment scheme which included radical disparities in the population of
various state legislative districts.
179  In Wesberry v. Sanders,18 0
174 Congress promoted alien suffrage with the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. See
Act of Aug. 7, 1789, ch. 8, 1 Stat. 50. It also authorized aliens to vote in state
constitutional conventions in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan, and Illinois. See ORDINANCE
OF 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT, art. V; see also supra notes 72-
81 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of an alien suffrage provision in
Illinois and public policies supporting alien suffrage). Moreover, Congress admitted
several states into the union whose constitutions explicitly provided for alien suffrage
including Vermont, Virginia, Michigan, and Illinois. See VT. CONST. of 1767,
§ XXXVIII; VA. CONST. of 1776; MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1; ILL. CONsT. of
1818, art. II, § 27; see also Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. (2 Scam.) 377 (1840) (pointing
out that Congress approved the republicanism of alien suffrage).
"It is here to be remembered, that the constitution of the state of Illinois
was required, by the act of congress of the 18th of April, 1818, to be
republican .... By the resolution of the congress of the United States, of the
3d December, 1818, it is expressly declared, that the constitution and state
government so formed is republican . ..
Id. at 393.
175 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
176 See id. at 475-76. The Supreme Court has held that state statutes "which may
dilute the effectiveness of some citizens' votes, receive close scrutiny from this Court."
Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (citing Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964)). In Kramer, the court held that a New York Education Law,
which limited the franchise in school district elections to those who had a primary
interest in school affairs, violated the Equal Protection Clause because it did not
accomplish its purpose with sufficient precision and was not necessary to promote a
compelling state interest. See id. at 632.
I7 377 U.S. 533 (1967).
178 See id. at 566 (emphasis added).
179 Id. at 561-77.
i80 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
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where the Court invalidated on Article I grounds a lopsided
districting scheme for U.S. Congressional districts in Georgia,
18 1
the Court found that "the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representa-
tives be chosen 'by the people of the several States' means that as
nearly as is practicable one man's vote in a congressional election is
to be worth as much as another's."18 2 It is meaningful that in this
formulation and others, the Wesberry Court employs not the
language of "citizens" but of persons.18 3 This is more than a
semantic point, because the rationale for the Court's decision was
that "those who framed the Constitution meant that, no matter what
the mechanics of an election, whether statewide or by districts, it
was population which was to be the basis for the House of Represen-
tatives."18 4 Population in the Constitution meant not the number
of U.S. citizens living in the states, but "the whole Number of free
Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and
excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons."
18 5
By this definition, aliens, who were voting in many places at the
time, were to be included in the "population" and counted in the
census. Today, aliens are still counted in the decennial census along
with citizens and are thus factored numerically into congressional
reapportionment. 186 In another case elaborating the meaning of
Reynolds, the Supreme Court denied that the Equal Protection
Clause either requires or forbids the inclusion of aliens in the state
legislative apportionment base, stating that the "decision to include
or exclude [aliens, transients, short-term or temporary residents, or
181 See id. at 7-8.
182 Id. (quoting THE U.S. CONSTITUTION) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
183 See id. at 7 ("If the Federal Constitution intends that when qualiftied voters elect
members of Congress each vote be given as much weight as any other vote, then this
statute cannot stand." (emphasis added)).
184 Id. at 8-9 (emphasis added). The Court further found that
[t]he debates at the Convention make at least one fact abundantly clear:
that when the delegates agreed that the House should represent 'people'
they intended that in allocating Congressmen, the number assigned to each
State should be determined solely by the number of the State's inhabitants.
The Constitution embodied Edmund Randolph's proposal for a periodic
census to ensure 'fair representation of the people,' an idea endorsed by
Mason as assuring that 'numbers of inhabitants' should always be the
measure of representation in the House of Representatives.
Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
185 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2, cl. 3 (this infamous provision was amended by Section
2 of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868).
86 See U.S. Census 1990. See generally HYMAN ALTERMAN, COUNTING PEOPLE:
THE CENSUS IN HISTORY (1969).
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persons denied the vote for conviction of crime] involves choices
... with which we have been shown no constitutionally founded
reason to interfere."
187
B. The Suffrage Amendments
A more subtle question is whether noncitizen voting offends the
various suffrage amendments (the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
fourth and Twenty-sixth) which make explicit mention of "citizens."
The Fifteenth Amendment provides: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude." 188 If such language is not designed to
exclude aliens from voting, perhaps it discloses a general under-
standing that voting is for citizens only. But this reading is badly
strained: the language specifies only that states may not exclude any
citizen from the franchise on the basis of race, not that the states
may not include noncitizens in the franchise. Perhaps this is why the
Court in Minor v. Happersett,189 sitting only four years after ap-
proval of the Fifteenth Amendment, did not interpret the appear-
ance of the word "citizens" to invalidate the common and readily
visible practice of noncitizen voting in the states.
1 90
Beyond its plain language, the Fifteenth Amendment's legislative
history shows that Congress clearly contemplated that noncitizen
suffrage would survive the amendment's adoption. Such a definitive
record exists thanks to Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, who
in 1869 offered an amendment that would have extended the
Fifteenth Amendment's reach to ban racial discrimination in voting
not only against citizens but against noncitizens as well.191 The
187 Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92 (1966) (upholding Hawaii's use of
registered voters as a legislative apportionment base, where such base led to
distribution of legislators not substantially different from what would have resulted
from the use of a population base).
188 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (emphasis added). In 1868, two years before
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, the addition of the Fourteenth Amendment
marked the first appearance of the word "citizens" in the Constitution.
189 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874).
190 See id. at 177.
191 Sumner's substitute language read: "The right to vote and hold office shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States, nor by any State, on account of race,
color or previous condition of servitude." CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1030
(1869).
True to form, the brilliant and clever Sumner disingenuously disclaimed that his
intention was to prevent racial discrimination in the enfranchisement of noncitizens,
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proposal provoked a vitriolic response from several Senators, mostly
representing Western states, who opposed forcing alien suffrage
states to share the vote with the swelling population of Chinese
immigrants.1 92 These Senators argued that Sumner's amendment
would deprive states of their power to extend the vote exclusively
to aliens from Europe, forcing them to choose between enfranchis-
ing all aliens or none at all. Illinois Senator Lyman Trumbull rose
quickly after Sumner introduced his amendment:
If you strike out the words "citizens of the United States" you
extend this amendment. Now, in some of the states citizenship is
not a requisite to suffrage; persons who are not citizens vote in
some of the States of the Union. There would be nothing in this
amendment, as the committee have [sic] reported it, to prevent
those States discriminating against persons who are not citizens on
account of race or color; but if the amendment proposed by the
arguing that the purpose of his amendment was only to clarify and shorten the
language of the Fifteenth Amendment.
I am simplifying it now: I am reducing it to its minimum. The right to vote
shall not be abridged on account of race or color; that is the proposition we
want to establish. There is no occasion to burden it by the words "of
citizens of the United States;" they are absolute surplusage there, and they
burden the sentence. It is not a matter of any great consequence, however.
Id.
Unfortunately for Sumner, alert Senators from the West Coast, imbued with an
extraordinary and unabashed anti-Chinese animus, detected the true meaning and
effect of Sumner's amendment and unleashed a series of diatribes about the impact
of enfranchising noncitizen Chinese and making them citizens. Indiana Senator
Oliver Morton stated that:
[The Chinese] are now treated most brutally, as I am advised, in California
and everywhere upon the Pacific coast. Their personal and civil rights are
not regarded. They have submitted to this up to the present time; but as
their numbers increase they may soon come to outnumber the white people
upon that coast. It is not impossible that in the next ten or twenty years
they may outnumber all other populations upon that coast; and then they
will come to understand their power, and then the cruelties and brutalities
that they now suffer and have suffered from the time they first went there
may drive them to seize the political power into their hands. The fact that
they made no such attempt up to this time does not prove that they may not
yet do it."
Id. at 1034.
Sumner finally ended up addressing the merits of the racial issue, arguing that:
"As I have read the Declaration of Independence, it says 'all men are created equal.'
It does not say, 'all white men.'" Id. at 1035. But after finding himself alone in the
debate, Sumner read the political writing on the wall and withdrew his amendment.
See id.
192 See id. at 1030-40 (statements of Senators Conness, Williams, Corbett, and
Trumbull).
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Senator from Massachusetts is adopted the State of Michigan and
the State of Indiana, which formerly, and I believe now, allowed
persons to vote without naturalization, could not discriminate
against unnaturalized persons on account of race or color; but if
the committee's amendment is adopted they could so discriminate.
So that striking out these words enlarges the scope of the
proposition and takes from the State of Indiana, by way of
illustration, the power of discrimination among unnaturalized
persons on account of race or color.... Citizenship and the right
of suffrage were never synonymous terms; they do not necessarily
go together at all. But if this amendment of the Senator from
Massachusetts is adopted it will not be in the power of Indiana to
discriminate against persons who are not citizens on account of
race or color.
193
Other Senators also made it clear that they opposed Sumner's
amendment because they wanted to preserve the right of states to
enfranchise white aliens while excluding the Chinese.
194
Thus, the inclusion of the word "citizens" in the Fifteenth
Amendment clearly does not work, and was not intended, to
prevent noncitizen suffrage in the states. Rather, if the unabashed
and highly specific intentions of Senator Sumner's adversaries are
to be followed, the presence of the word "citizens" functions only
to permit the states, in awarding the franchise, to discriminate
between groups of noncitizens on the basis of race and color. Of
course, it would be comforting to conclude that other Constitutional
principles are available today to invalidate a law granting the vote
to aliens of only one race, but it is not clear whether such principles
have the momentum to overcome a legislative history so definitive
in the eyes of a Supreme Court fixed on "original intent."195 The
193 Id. at 1030.
194 See id. at 1033. Indiana Senator Oliver P. Morton stated:
Mr. President, there can be no mistake about one thing: that if the words
"citizens of the United States" be stricken out, as suggested by the Senator
from Massachusetts, the effect is to take away from any State the right to
discriminate on account of race, color, or previous condition of slavery in
the case of the Chinese, and that a Chinaman will be made eligible to office
and will have the right to vote.
Id.
195 The Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, commanding that no
state "deny to any penon within itsjurisdiction the equal protection of the laws," U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added), is obviously the strongest candidate for
such service in the unlikely event that a state were to pass such a law. It is clear that
"an alien is entitled to the shelter of the Equal Protection Clause." Sugarman v.
Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 641 (1973) (striking down a New York law reserving
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important point is that no statement by any Senator at that time
evinces any intention of foreclosing the option of alien suffrage to
the states. The reappearance of the word "citizens" in the Nine-
teenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-sixth Amendments does nothing
to alter the viability of this conclusion. 196 It could be argued that,
by closing the gap between citizenship and suffrage, the later
suffrage amendments-the Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth and Twenty-
sixth-implicitly confined the right of voting to citizens. 197  But
this argument collapses under the weight of three decisive prob-
lems. First, nothing in the legislative history of those amendments
reflects an intention to revoke the states' power to grant alien
suffrage.198  Second, from the standpoint of federalism, it is
permanent civil service positions to U.S. citizens). It can be argued that since the
Equal Protection clause forbids racial discrimination, and since aliens constitute a
suspect class within the meaning of the clause, a state actor could not extend the
franchise to some groups of aliens but withhold it from others on the basis of race.
See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) (striking down on equal protection
grounds a West Virginia statute that denied to citizens the right to be jurors based
solely upon their color).
This argument could encounter opposition on the current Supreme Court. After
all, the legislative history surrounding passage of the Fifteenth Amendment can be
read to furnish far more specific authority as to the framers' "original intent"
regarding the voting rights of aliens. Given that the Supreme Court has never held
that aliens have a Constitutional right to vote and that the more recent trend is to cut
back on equal protection coverage for aliens, see Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S.
432, 436-47 (1982) (upholding a California law preventing aliens from becoming
peace officers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294-300 (1978) (sustaining against
equal protection attack a New York law requiring police officers to be U.S. citizens),
it is at best uncertain whether this Court would strike down a racially discriminatory
alien suffrage law. On the other hand, antidiscrimination principles may now be so
embedded in the fabric of the Constitution that such a judgment may be unduly
pessimistic.
196 These three amendments track the language of the Fifteenth Amendment in
stating that the "right of citizens" to vote shall not be "denied or abridged" on
account of sex, failure to pay a poll tax, or age (so long as the citizen is eighteen),
respectively. There is nothing in the legislative histories of the passage of these three
amendments that reveals an intention to remove the state power to grant alien
suffrage. The prohibitions contained in these amendments are directed only at
discriminatory state action towards specific groups of citizens and accomplish no
change in the state's general power to define the electorate.
197 The Supreme Court of Alaska made precisely this argument in the course of
finding that the state constitutional provision barring aliens from voting in Alaska did
not violate equal protection. See Park v. State, 528 P.2d 785, 787 (1974) ("Because
all of these voting rights [contained in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and
Twenty-sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution] are applied expressly
only to citizens, the necessary implication is that such rights are not available to
aliens."). This argument is both a logical fallacy and a misreading of constitutional
history.
198 There is no evidence, for example, that the Nineteenth Amendment was ever
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tenuous to suggest that the Constitution has categorically prohibited
a historically common and accepted state practice indirectly and by
way of implication. This is especially so in the voting area, where
the judiciary has traditionally deferred to the plenary power of the
states, interfering only to expand-not contract-the circle of demo-
cratic inclusion. 199 Finally, citizenship and suffrage continue to
be distinct legal categories: not all citizens get to vote, and not all
voters are citizens. Several classes of citizens, such as ex-felons in
many states, and children in all of them, are still disenfranchis-
ed.200  Conversely, noncitizens are still permitted to vote in
certain local elections, such as school board elections in Chicago
and New York and municipal elections in a number of Maryland
interpreted at the time of passage to abolish the power of states to enfranchise
noncitizens. Indeed, the amendment enfranchising women was ratified by three
states engaging in the practice (Arkansas, Indiana, and Texas) and none saw it as
impairing the policy of alien suffrage. See 66 CONG. REC. 635 (1920). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has explicitly linked the role of the Nineteenth Amendment to
that of the Fifteenth Amendment. See Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 136 (1972)
("[The Nineteenth Amendment] is in character and phraseology precisely similar to
the Fifteenth.").
199 See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125 (1970) (stating that "[n]o function
is more essential to the separate and independent existence of the States and their
governments than the power to determine within the limits of the Constitution the
qualifications of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices"). It is well-
accepted that "the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for
themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections."
Id. at 124-25 (footnote omitted). The Constitutional inroads made against the states'
power over voting all reflect the conception of an expanding franchise. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI. Furthermore, the Court has usually
intervened only to defend voting rights. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972)
(striking down a one-year residency requirement); Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of
Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (striking down poll tax). Where courts have decided
against voting rights, it is only in the course of acquiescing to state restrictions on the
franchise. See Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60 (1978) (upholding a state
statute which made residents of a suburban community subject to certain city
regulations, but not allowing them to participate in city elections); Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding a literacy
requirement for voting). It would be extraordinary for a court to strike down a state
law extending the vote to state residents.
200 See Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex.Felons: Citizenship, Criminality, and "The
Purity of the Ballot Box," 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300 (1989); Vita Wallace, Give the
Children the Vote, THE NATION, Oct. 14, 1991, at 439.
It may be objected that children and ex-felons, both groups of citizens, are only
permissibly excluded from the franchise because of the implications of Section 2 of
the Fourteenth Amendment. But aliens stand on the same footing as they do.
Without this language in Section 2, the argument that aliens have a constitutional
right to vote would have additional, if not decisive, force.
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localities.20 1 Nothing in the suffrage amendments requires states
to confine voting to U.S. citizens.
C. The Naturalization Clause
Article I, Section 8 confers on Congress the power to "establish
an uniform Rule of Naturalization ... ."202 The question may
arise whether state or local enfranchisement of noncitizens is
inconsistent with this power and therefore invalid under the
Constitution's Supremacy Clause. 20 3 This question does not, in
fact, pose a serious problem because alien voting in no way
interferes with congressional control over immigration and
naturalization. Of course, any local law that purports to modify the
terms of a resident's immigration status is presumptively in violation
of the Supremacy Clause and preempted by federal immigration
law.20 4 But noncitizen voting does not subtract from the obliga-
tions imposed on aliens by immigration law or otherwise frustrate
the purposes of such law. The simple right to vote in local
elections, or even state and federal elections, neither confers U.S.
citizenship for federal purposes nor immunizes aliens against the
operation of any provision of immigration or naturalization
law.20 5 A resident alien who today has the right to vote in a
201 SeeJamin B. Raskin, Votes for Al Citizens or Not, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1991, at
B7.
202 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. The Congressional power over immigration and
naturalization has been construed broadly. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsTTrUTIONAL LAW § 5-16 (1988) ("Sweeping as are Congress' war-related powers,
the Court has emphasized time and again that '"over no conceivable subject is the
legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over"' the admission of
aliens.") (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977), quoting Oceanic Navigation
Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320,339 (1909))). The deference shown Congress in this
field, however, does not weaken the argument here because the institution of
noncitizen suffrage in no way interferes with the exercise of that power.
203 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
204 See Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896). It has long been
recognized that any state or local effort to interfere with federal policies and agencies
"is absolutely void, wherever such attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts
with the laws of the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the national
legislation or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the federal government to
discharge the duties for the performance of which they were created." Id. The test
is whether a law in question "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941). For example, permitting all residents of Cleveland to vote in local
elections, regardless of citizenship, would not be preempted, but providing that all
residents of Cleveland, including aliens, are citizens of the United States, would be.
205 The voting noncitizen does not become a citizen for the purposes of running
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Chicago school board election could be deported tomorrow by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service for various statutory
reasons, including marriage fraud,2°6 smuggling,20 7 terrorist
activities,208 or criminal conviction for most narcotics2° and
firearm offenses. 210 Both aliens and citizens can break the law,
and the right of aliens to vote no more impairs the efficiency of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in enforcing immigration
law than the right of citizens to vote impairs the efficiency of the
Justice Department in enforcing criminal law.211 In sum, the
United States Constitution places no obstacles in the path of states
and localities willing to enfranchise noncitizens.
2 12
D. Is Alien Suffrage Constitutionally Mandatory?
The obverse of the argument that the Constitution forbids alien
voting is that the Constitution requires it. Fifteen years ago, Gerald
Rosberg presented a good argument for this proposition: that equal
protection should be read to guarantee the right of resident aliens
in the states to vote at all levels of government.213  Although
Rosberg's thesis offers important insights into the value of alien
suffrage, it runs against the language of the Fourteenth Amendment
and defies the logic of suffrage expansion in the United States. For
even if we follow the doctrinal somersaults required to arrive at
for the House of Representative after seven years or for the Senate after nine years.
See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3. Nor does she become a citizen for the purposes of gaining
immunity from state laws which may legitimately discriminate against noncitizens. See
supra note 136.
206 See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(G) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
207 See id. § 1251(a)(1)(E).
208 See id. § 1251(a)(4)(B).
209 See id. § 1251(a)(2)(B).
210 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a)(2)(C) (West Supp. 1992). Other classes of deportable
aliens include those who were excludable by law at the time of entry, those who
entered without inspection, and those who are engaged in espionage, sabotage, or any
efforts to overthrow the government of the United States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988
& Supp. III).
211 See Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896).
212 But see Neuman, supra note 13, at 324 ("It is probably true, however, that
modern constitutional law would uphold an explicit congressional prohibition on
alien voting."). This judgment is probably accurate given the great latitude the
Supreme Court has allowed Congress in defining its naturalization power. But the
historical role played by alien suffrage in American local self-government and the
traditional power of states and localities to define their own electorates could equally
yield the conclusion that an attempted congressional prohibition on noncitizen voting
would infringe on the Tenth Amendment interests of the states or the people.
213 See generally Rosberg, supra note 13.
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Rosberg's position, his argument is not wholly persuasive as a
description, historical or normative, of how the franchise expands
in the American polity. None of the principal excluded national
groups who gained access to the ballot in American history did so
by way of judicial action through the Equal Protection Clause.
Rather, they fought their way in through political agitation. This
history encloses an important democratic logic: it is the standing
citizenry, after hearing and debating appeals from the voteless, that
must extend rights of political membership to disenfranchised
outsiders seeking entry and equality.
Rosberg acknowledged that "the Supreme Court's inclination on
this issue is not at all in doubt."21 4 Shortly before he wrote his
article in 1977, the Supreme Court had dismissed an appeal from
the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Skafte v. Rorex,
2 15
which found that the Constitution did not require Colorado to grant
noncitizens voting rights in local elections. In Skafte, a permanent
resident alien claimed that the Colorado statutes that denied him
the right to vote in school board elections violated not only the
Equal Protection Clause but also the Due Process and the Suprema-
cy Clauses. 216 The Colorado Supreme Court rejected each claim,
finding that on the equal protection argument the United States
Supreme Court "has consistently used language suggesting that
citizenship with respect to the franchise is not a suspect classifica-
tiori." 217 Applying the mere rationality test, the Colorado court
decided, in a conclusory and somewhat overheated passage, that the
"state has a rational interest in limiting participation in government
to those persons within the political community. Aliens are not a
part of the political community."21' The court went on to reject
the argument that citizenship is a permissible suffrage restriction in
general elections but not school board elections, finding sufficient
indications in prior U.S. Supreme Court decisions to conclude that
"school elections are elections involving participation by the
political community. " 219 In denying the appeal in Skafte, the
214 Id. at 1100.
215 553 P.2d 830 (Colo. 1976), appeal dismissed, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
216 See Skafte, 553 P.2d at 830.
217 Id. at 832. The Colorado court relied on Supreme Court precedent in
rejecting the equal protection, due process, and supremacy arguments. See id. at 833-
35.
218 Id. at 832. The Colorado court would have been on firmer ground if it had
found that aliens are not a necessaty part of the political community.
219 Id. at 833. The Court also noted that "voting in school elections involves
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Supreme Court simply noted that the case lacked a substantial
federal question and summarily invoked the authority of Sugarman
v. Dougal 220 and Kramer v. Union Free School District.221  In
Sugarman, the Court remarked: "This Court has never held that
aliens have a constitutional right to vote or to hold high public
office under the Equal Protection Clause. Indeed, implicit in many
of this Court's voting rights decisions is the notion that citizenship
is a permissible criterion for limiting such rights." 222 In Kramer,
the Court struck down a New York law limiting the franchise in
certain school board elections to parents of children in school and
those owning or leasing local taxable property. 223 The Court
there noted that even the plaintiff, an adult bachelor living at home
with his parents, did not contest "that the States have the power to
impose reasonable citizenship, age, and residency requirements on
the availability of the ballot."
224
Rosberg found irony in the Court's invocation of Sugarman and
Kramer to reject the argument that the Constitution required alien
suffrage.225 Sugarman had determined that aliens were a suspect
class for equal protection purposes. 226 Kramer found that statutes
limiting the franchise give rise to strict or "exacting" judicial
scrutiny because the right to vote is fundamental and "preservative
of other basic civil and political rights."227 If any two cases could
produce an argument that alien voting was constitutionally com-
pelled, Rosberg imagined, it would be the combination of Sugarman
and Kramer. But the Supreme Court mobilized these cases for the
opposite purpose: to show that aliens were not a suspect class for
voting purposes and that voting statutes that enforced citizenship
qualifications transgressed no constitutional boundary.
228
participation in the decision makingprocess of the polity, a factor which indicates the
'general' nature of such elections." Id. It was an easy step then for the court to find
that the statutory classification depriving aliens of the right to vote was "properly
tailored to the state's interest." Id.
220 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
22 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
222 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 648-49.
223 See Kramer, 395 U.S. at 625, 631-33.
224 Id. at 625.
225 See Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1102 ("By citing the discussion of alien voting
in Sugarman and Kramer, the Supreme Court evidently wanted to show that even at
the time it was formulating these propositions it did not believe that they could be
carried to the point of establishing a right to vote for aliens.").
226 See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 641.
227 Kramer, 395 U.S. at 626, 628-29 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562
(1964)).
228 This was not the first time that the Court failed to take an opportunity to find
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Rosberg develops a powerful and syllogistic counter-argument.
Voting, he correctly maintains, has never been construed as "a right
or privilege of state or national citizenship" under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.2 29 Indeed, the so-called "right to vote" does not exist but
is simply a "convenient shorthand for the right to 'participate in
state elections on an equal basis with other qualified voters
whenever the State has adopted an elective process. '"' 230 But this
"right to equal treatment, as the voting rights cases have clearly
acknowledged, is derived from the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause,
which declares that no state shall deny any person the equal
protection of the laws." 23 1 It is this language which has enabled
the Court to strike down state laws that discriminate against persons
on the basis of alienage. Thus, Rosberg concludes, "[i]f the right to
equal treatment in the electoral process owes its origin to the
[E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause, and it undeniably does, then whatever
the dicta in earlier cases it must be persons and not just citizens
who enjoy that right."23 2 If a state offers anyone within its bor-
ders the right to vote, it may not deny the vote to aliens unless its
decision "can pass the rigorous test of strict scrutiny."233 The rest
of Rosberg's argument seeks to demonstrate that any asserted state
interests in depriving aliens of the right to vote are not sufficiently
compelling to sustain strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.m
alien suffrage a constitutional necessity. Most of the passages from Supreme Court
opinions used to refute the idea that alien voting is forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause function equally well to refute the idea that alien voting is compulsory under
the Equal Protection Clause.
229 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1108.
230 Id. (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78
(1973)).
231 Id. at 1108-09. Even this approvingly relayed passage from Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
at 35 n.78 (1973), however, pulls against the conscious direction of Rosberg's
argument. Note that the Court affirms only the right to "participate in state elections
on an equal basis with other qualified voters whenever the State has adopted an
elective process." Id. (emphasis supplied). Of course, if aliens are not qualified
voters, then the Equal Protection Clause does not secure their right to participate
equally in the electoral process.
232 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1109.
233 Id.
234 See id. at 1109-35. Rosberg contends that the following asserted state interests
are constitutionally insufficient to uphold the disenfranchisement ofaliens: that they
lack a "sufficient stake" in governmental affairs; that they are likely to practice vote
fraud; that they vote as a bloc; that they lack the knowledge required to cast an
intelligent vote; and that they are missing the required loyalty to the nation and its
political institutions. See id. at 1115. Rosberg's probing discussion of these claims
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This cogent argument encounters one large doctrinal roadblock,
recognized (if a bit brusquely) by Rosberg,235 in the Fourteenth
Amendment itself. Section 2 includes little-noticed language clearly
indicating constitutional permission for states to impose citizenship
as a voting qualification. It states that:
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when
the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for
President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives
in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male
inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens
of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation
in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one
years of age in such State.
2 6
This provision, which operates to reduce a State's House representa-
tion in direct proportion to the number of its disenfranchised adult
male citizens, white or black, marked a compromise between radical
Republicans in Congress who wanted to guarantee all black citizens
the right to vote and conservative Democrats who sought to
preserve total state control over the franchise. 2 7 On the terms
of the compromise, a state could employ a literacy test to keep
blacks from voting, but would then face the prospect of not
retaining its full representation in Congress.23 8 "In the historical
context, no one could have understood this language as anything
other than an abandonment of the principle of Negro suffrage
*.. -"239 Many radical Republicans thus attacked the Fourteenth
Amendment "[b]ecause it implicitly acknowledged the right of states
to limit voting because of race, Wendell Phillips denounced the
amendment as a 'fatal and total surrender.'
240
generates excellent policy arguments for alien suffrage even if, as contended here, the
underlying Fourteenth Amendment analysis to which they are attached is weak.
235 See Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1102-04.
236 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2.
237 See FONER, supra note 11, at 252-53.
238 See id at 253.
239Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 162 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
240 FONER, supra note 11, at 255 (quoting Stevens Papers, Communication of
Wendell Phillips to Thaddeus Stevens (Apr. 30, 1866)). Others thought that this
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Justice Harlan later wrote that the "only sensible explanation of
§ 2 ... is that the racial voter qualifications it was designed to
penalize were understood to be permitted by § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment."21 But the language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's second section reveals not only a willingness to permit, for
a price, the disenfranchisement of blacks; there is also the inescap-
able implication that women, noncitizens, criminals, and those
under twenty-one years of age do not form a necessary part of a
core voting polity. For, while the disenfranchisement of African-
Americans at least triggered an automatic constitutional reduction
in the national political power of the white male political class, the
disenfranchisement of women, aliens, and criminals had no such
effect. These categories of exclusion were thus considered not only
within the actual power of the states, but within the range of
unpunished and normatively acceptable options. Indeed, for this
reason, Susan B. Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and other
leaders of the women's suffrage movement "felt betrayed, because
the second clause for the first time introduced the word 'male' into
the Constitution."
242
Later cases confirmed the implication in Section 2 of the
Fourteenth Amendment that Section 1 did not prohibit discrimina-
tion in voting against certain enumerated groups. The Court's 1970
decision in Oregon v. Mitchell 243 is especially instructive in this
regard. The Court found there that it was beyond the power of
indirect method of encouraging states to enfranchise blacks was the best that could
be hoped for until another amendment could be passed to deal with black voting
rights directly. See id. at 261. "Henry M. Turner, the black minister and political
organizer who had been sent to Washington to lobby for black rights by Georgia's
statewide black convention, reported home: 'several Congressmen tell me, "the negro
must vote," but the issue must be avoided now so as "to keep up a two thirds power
in Congress."'" Id. (quoting John E. Bryant Papers, Communication of Henry M.
Turner to John E. Bryant (Apr. 13, 1866)).
241 Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 169-70. Harlan canvassed the legislative history of the
Fourteenth Amendment contained in the Journal of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction. He concluded that it yielded with "startling clarity" first, that "the
Committee regularly rejected explicitly enfranchising proposals in favor of plans
which would postpone enfranchisement, leave it to congressional discretion, or
abandon it altogether," and second, that "the abandonment of Negro suffrage as a
goal exactly corresponded with the adoption of provisions to reduce representation
for discriminatory restrictions on the ballot." Id. at 170-71.
242 FONER, supra note 11, at 255. Foner goes on to state, incorrectly: "Alone
among suffrage restrictions, those founded on sex would not reduce a state's
representation." Id. Alienage, age, and criminal status also were deemed categories
upon which states could premise exclusion with impunity.
243 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
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Congress to establish, as it had attempted to do in the 1970
Amendment of the Voting Rights Act, the right of eighteen-year-
olds to vote in state and local elections. 244  As Justice Black
stated: "No function is more essential to the separate and indepen-
dent existence of the States and their governments than the power
to determine within the limits of the Constitution the qualifications
of their own voters for state, county, and municipal offices .... "-
245 On the other hand, a majority in Mitchell also found that
Congress did possess the constitutional power-under Article I,
Section 2 and the Necessary and Proper Clause, according to justice
Black,246 or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, according
to Justice Douglas24 7 -to grant eighteen-year-olds the right to vote
in national elections.
It is important to recall that eighteen-year-olds, like aliens, are
within the class of persons which Section 2 of the Fourteenth
Amendment implicitly consigned to their fate in the political
processes of the states. Thus, Rosberg's argument that aliens have
a constitutional right to vote in state elections even without
congressional legislation loses force when it is recognized that
eighteen-year-olds were deemed by the Supreme Court not to have
such a right even with congressional legislation.
The message contained in Mitchell was sharpened and elaborated
in the Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Richardson v. Ramirez.
248
In Ramirez, the Court reversed a California Supreme Court
judgment holding that California's disenfranchisement of convicted
felons violated equal protection. 249 Crucial to the Court's deci-
sion was its interpretation of Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which reduces the popular basis for representation when a
state denies the right to vote "to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States ... except for participation in rebellion, or other crime."
250
Focusing on the meaning of the italicized section, Justice Rehnquist
determined that "the exclusion of felons from the vote has an
affirmative sanction in § 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, [and]...
244 See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 118.
245 Id. at 125 (Opinion of Black., J.).
246 See id. at 119-31.
247 See id. at 141-44 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248 418 U.S. 24 (1974).
249 See id. at 56.
250 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 161 n.12 (emphasis added) (quoting U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 2).
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that § 1, in dealing with voting rights as it does, could not have
been meant to bar outright a form of disenfranchisement which was
expressly exempted from the less drastic sanction of reduced
representation which § 2 imposed for other forms of disenfranchise-
ment."
2 51
Rosberg readily conceded that, as construed in the Ramirez case,
"section 2 of the [Flourteenth [A]mendment disposes of the claim
that a denial of the vote to aliens is unconstitutional under section
1. " 252 This is a necessary conclusion given that "[s]ection 2 treats
aliens and felons precisely alike-a state that denies the vote to
aliens is just as free from any sanction under section 2 as a state
that denies the vote to felons." 253 But Rosberg cast doubt on the
durability of Ramirez and then stated that, "even if section 2 is
dispositive, it is not a very satisfying way to dispose of the case
because it resolves the equal protection arguments by making it
unnecessary to consider them on the merits." 254 Throwing doc-
trine to the winds, he proceeded to his strict scrutiny equal
protection analysis.
Rosberg is, of course, free to dispute the merits of the Ramirez
decision and to argue, quite elegantly, that it "goes well beyond
anything required by the language, history, or purpose of the
[F]ourteenth [A]mendment."255 But even if Section 2 did not
implicitly condone different levels of suffrage discrimination in the
states, important reasons remain to be skeptical of the claim that
Section I of the Fourteenth Amendment should be construed to
secure the right of noncitizens to vote. The pathway to political
membership taken by disenfranchised groups in the American
community has been constitutional politics and amendment, not
constitutional litigation and interpretation. 25 6  The property
qualification was dropped, not after court decisions, but after demo-
cratic agitation in the states for statutory and constitutional
changes. 25 7 The Fourteenth Amendment did not alter this dy-
namic: with the general terms of Section 1 and negative implica-
251 Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54-55.
252 Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1103.
253 Id. at 1103-04.
254 Id. at 1104.
255 Id.
256 See generally SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 25-62 (discussing the political struggle of
groups formerly disenfranchised).
2 7 See generally WILLIAMSON, supra note 7 (examining the circumstances in which
the freehold qualification was eliminated in the various states).
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tions of Section 2, it completely failed to confront the problem of
black disenfranchisement, much less the disenfranchisement of
women. Much later, the Fourteenth Amendment came to play a
role in advancing principles of equal protection among eligible and
existing registered voters, 258 but African-Americans were only
liberated from their widespread disenfranchisement and subjugation
under Dred SCott 259 by way of the enactment of the Fifteenth
Amendment,260 passed two years after the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Similarly, women only
escaped their Court-approved disenfranchisement through passage
of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.261 And eighteen-year-olds
gained the complete right to vote in 1971 with ratification of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment.262  This constitutional amendment
became necessary after a majority of the Supreme Court, in Oregon
v. Mitchell,263 found that Congress did not have the power, under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or any other constitutional
provision, to invade the political domain of the states by lowering
the voting age in state and local elections to eighteen.
There may be grounds to criticize judicial reluctance to declare
new voting rights for excluded groups, but it is not clear that
judicial, as opposed to political, enlargement of the franchise is to
be preferred. The matter of who votes is the central question in a
community's process of political self-definition. It is, therefore, a
constitutional question in the strictest sense of the word: it
determines who constitutes the body politic. While it is often
thought that constitutional questions belong exclusively to the
courts, Paul Brest has rightly emphasized that "[c]onstitutional
discourse and decision-making are the most fundamental preroga-
tives and responsibilities of citizens."26 4 It is clearly more demo-
258 See e.g., Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 630-33 (1969)
(upholding the right of an otherwise eligible voter who does not own or otherwise
lease taxable property or have children enrolled in public schools to vote in school
district elections); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (establishing the right
of a member of the armed services to vote where he is domiciled in the service even
if he did not reside there prior to service); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,568 (1964)
(establishing the principle of one person-one vote in state legislative elections).
259 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
260 U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
261 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
262 U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI.
263 400 U.S. 112, 117-18 (1970).
264 Paul Brest, Further Beyond the Republican RevivaL" Toward Radical Republicanism,
97 YALE LJ. 1623, 1628 (1988) (emphasis omitted).
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cratic to permit citizens, rather than judges, to decide who may
enter the constitutive political space of the society. Those currently
voting have an obvious interest in defining the franchise: every
prospective new voting member theoretically dilutes the voting
power of each current member or enriches the meaning of the
political community for all. Indeed, the definition of the electorate
is closely linked to the character and destiny of the community.
The very democratic logic which argues for alien suffrage-that the
governed should be able to participate in decisionmaking over
them-strongly suggests that it is the existing electorate which
should determine the shape of the electorate to come. 265 Further-
more, social contracts that are expanded by citizens themselves are
surely made of more durable stuff than social contracts renegotiated
by judicial power.
It could be objected that popular reluctance to share the vote
with new groups requires judicial control over definition of the
electorate. But this objection greatly underestimates not only the
ability of disenfranchised groups to communicate their cause to
voting members of society, but also the willingness of voters to
listen. In both American and European history, citizens have
regularly expanded the franchise when confronted with a compel-
ling logic to do so. The propertied enfranchised the propertyless,
whites enfranchised blacks, men enfranchised women, and so on.
More to the point, the voteless fared much better appealing to the
people and to the legislative, as opposed to the judicial, process.
The Supreme Court gave us Dred Scott2 6 6 and Minor v. Happer-
sett,267 but Congress and two-thirds of the states gave us the
Fifteenth Amendment and women's suffrage. There is no reason to
think that courts will glimpse the logic of extending the franchise
earlier than the people themselves, who have a much greater
understanding of the meaning of voting for people lacking other
265 Moral philosopher Michael Walzer has come to the same conclusion about the
analogous question of who may fix immigration policies and define standards of
national membership: "Initially, at least, the sphere of membership is given: the men
and women who determine what membership means, and who shape the admissions
policies of the political community, are simply the men and women who are already
there." MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALIrY 43 (1983). "It is important first to insist that the distribution of
membership in American society, and in any ongoing society, is a matter of political
decision." Id. at 40.
266 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
267 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (upholding the provision of the Missouri state
constitution which denied females the right to vote).
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kinds of social power and resources. While Rosberg makes an
attractive argument that the Supreme Court veered away from a
plausible destination for its equal protection holdings,2 8 he
neglects the deep meaning of the American constitutional experi-
ence. Enlargement of the electorate has taken place by way of
democratic amendment to the Constitution,269 not judicial reap-
praisal of the meaning of constitutional terms long present. Of
course, this contention may be resisted in the alien suffrage context
by those who assume that citizens would simply never extend the
right to vote to noncitizens. But this assumption is not only wrong
as a matter of history, but, as I shall now argue, unduly fatalistic as
a matter of present political judgment.
III. THE CASE IN DEMOCRATIC THEORY FOR NONCITIZEN
VOTING AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
The argument for noncitizen voting in local government is
founded on the essential democratic ideas that pervade American
political and constitutional development. From the time of the
Revolution these ideas were central to the development of alien
suffrage, and they will form the principal rationale for any renewal
of the practice. But these ideas are bolstered today by evolving
norms of international human rights and "community democracy,"
norms which reflect profound changes in global economic structure
and tremendous surges in international immigration. The present
case for noncitizen voting thus draws on both classical American
democratic principles and an emerging global ideology of local
democracy.
A. The Classical Democratic Argument
The traditional democratic argument for suffrage rights,
formulated in the language of liberalism and natural rights, has
never lost its vitality.270 It is second nature to Americans, reduc-
ible to a few familiar maxims: government must rest on the consent
268 See Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1109 (arguing that "[i]f the right to equal
treatment in the electoral process owes its origin to the [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause,
... it must be persons and not just citizens who enjoy that right").269 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, XV, XVI, XIX.
270 "No historically significant form ofgovernment or of citizenship is in principle
incompatible with the exclusion of large groups of people, but natural-rights theory
makes it very difficult to find good reasons for excluding anyone from full political
membership in a modern republic." SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 37.
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of the governed, 27 1 no taxation without representation, 2 72 and
good-enough-to-fight-good-enough-to-vote. 273  Taken seriously,
these principles would destroy the seemingly principled dividing
line in the franchise which separates aliens from citizens.
Resident aliens are governed by our political institutions and are
subject to all laws which apply to citizens (and many which do not);
they must pay all taxes that citizens pay,2 74 they have fought as
soldiers in every major American war, and have, in various catego-
ries, been subject to the military draft.275 Because aliens lack
votes, the principal currency in which democratic politicians trade,
they are made especially susceptible to official discrimination and
hostility in the political system. As a French political scientist has
written, "immigrants' absence from the political arena makes this a
biased market in which xenophoebic [sic] initiatives can earn votes
without incurring the risk of losing other votes."
276
The classical democratic arguments for local alien suffrage are
captured beautifully in a concurrence byJustice Blackenridge in the
1809 Pennsylvania case of Stewart v. Foster,2 77 the first reported
case on local noncitizen voting. In Stewart, an alien freeholder who
had been living and paying taxes in Pittsburgh for the required one-
year period was denied the right to cast his vote by the election
judges.278 Justice Blackenridge agreed with the court's judgment
that Stewart had a legal right to vote because the legislature had
271 See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("[T]o secure these
rights, governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the
consent of the governed.").
272 This was the cry of the American Revolutionaries. See generally BERNARD
BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 117,209-21 (1967)
(arguing that the colonists experienced Parliament's illegal taxation as a "deliberate
assault of power upon liberty" and explaining how they objected to the Stamp Act's
transgression of the colonies' proper sphere of governance).
278 See WILLIAMSON, Supra note 7, at 133 (quoting an American verteran: "[W]e
fought for the right of voting and we will now exercise it." (citation omitted)).
n See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) (1992) ("[A]II citizens of the United States... and all
resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code....");
see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.14 (1979) ("As our cases have
emphasized, resident aliens pay taxes [and] serve in the Armed Forces .. .
275 See infra note 315 and accompanying text.
276 Yann Moulier-Boutang, Resistance to the Political Representation of Alien
Populations: The European Paradox, 19 INT'L MIGRATION REV. 485, 489 (1985)
(footnote omitted); see also Johnson, supra note 12, at 279, 360 (pointing out that
aliens seeking asylum are politically bulnerable).
277 2 Binn. 110 (Pa. 1809).
278 See id. (stating that the issue is whether an alien is entitled to vote in a borough
election) (emphasis added).
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intended to enfranchise aliens in Pittsburgh local elections.
279
But Blackenridge pressed further, arguing that it would have been
"wrong," according to constitutional, corporate or natural law
principles, for the state to exclude aliens from these elections.
28 0
His argument invoked two main lines of democratic principle:
The being an inhabitant, and the paying tax, are circumstances
which give an interest in the borough. The being an inhabitant,
gives an interest in the police or regulations of the borough
generally; the paying tax gives an interest in the appropriation of
the money levied. A right, therefore, to a voice mediately or
immediately in these matters, is founded in natural justice. To
reject this voice, or even to restrain it unnecessarily, would be
wrong. It would be as unjust as it would be impolitic. It is the
wise policy of every community to collect support from all on
whom it may be reasonable to impose it; and it is but reasonable
that all on whom it is imposed should have a voice to some extent
in the mode and object of the application.
28 1
The first line of democratic principle in Justice Blackenridge's
concurrence is that "being an inhabitant, gives an interest in the
police or regulations of the borough generally."282 This argument
may be captured in the phrase "no governance without representa-
tion," a democratic precept going back to John Locke,283 Thomas
279 See id. at 122.
280 See id. Blackenridge wrote:
Could the legislature have restrained farther without departing from a
general principle of almost every corporate body? Even in the monarchical
republic of Britain, every individual of that community is supposed to be
represented, virtually, as they call it, and to have a voice. I do not believe
that a legislature of Pennsylvania, would incorporate with a farther restraint
of privilege, unless by oversight. I believe they have not done it. I have not
examined at this time; but so far as my memory serves me, there is no
incorporation of a borough in which the being an inhabitant for a
reasonable time, and the paying a borough tax, does not entitle to a voice
for borough officers.
Id.
281 Id. Blackenridge went on to draw a line between the exclusion of aliens from
holding public office and the exclusion of aliens from voting- "Reasons of policy may
warrant the restraining the eligibility to office, but it must be a strong case of the
salus populi indeed, that will warrant the restraining, much less excluding, the right
of electing to office." Id.
282 Id.
283 Locke stated:
'Tis true, Governments cannot be supported without great Charge, and 'tis
fit every one who enjoys his share of the Protection, should pay out of his
Estate his proportion for the maintenance of it. But still it must be with his
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Paine,284 and the Declaration of Independence. Here lies the
very heart of the democratic idea: that governmental legitimacy
depends upon the affirmative consent of those who are governed.
Michael Walzer writes: "Men and women are either subject to the
state's authority, or they are not; and if they are subject, they must
be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what the authority
does."28 5 A city in which U.S. citizens who vote and hold office
govern noncitizens, who do not, is a city very likely engaged in a
tyrannical arrangement. For, as Walzer observes, "the rule of
citizens over noncitizens, of members over strangers, is probably the
most common form of tyranny in human history."
286
The second principle articulated is "no taxation without
representation," an argument whose ideological roots can be traced
back at least as far as the American Revolution.28 7 The idea is
closely linked to the property qualification, since the implicit
positive principle it asserts is "representation for all who are taxed,"
meaning, in the original historical sense, landowners. As originally
conceived, municipal corporations were political and economic
enterprises in which the landholders owned voting stock. The joint-
stockholder structure of the municipal corporation made it difficult
to justify the disenfranchisement of individual stockholders, or
"citizen-proprietor[s]" 28 8 in Turgot's formulation, on the basis of
their nationality. This economic logic for alien suffrage is in fact
replete in the historical record. 28 9 Today, when taxes are collect-
own Consent, i.e., the Consent of the Majority, giving it either by them-
selves, or their Representatives chosen by them.
JOHN LOcKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 140 (Peter Laslett ed., rev. ed. 1963).
284 According to Paine:
I mean that men are all of one degree, and consequently that all men are
born equal, and with equal natural right .... [Man] deposits this right in
the common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a
part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing.
Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter
of right.
THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 38-40 (The Heritage Press 1961) (1791).
285 WALZER, supra note 265, at 61.
286 Id. at 62. Walzer offers the examples of the Athenian Metics and guest
workers in contemporary Europe to describe tyrannical regimes in which those who
purportedly are present only for labor purposes in fact "are also subjects. They are
ruled ... by a band of citizen-tyrants." Id. at 58.
287 See BAILYN, supra note 272, at 117, 209-21.
288 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 36 (quoting KEITH BAKER, CONDORCET 208 (1975)).
289 See supra notes 277-87 and accompanying text (discussing democratic principle
condemning taxation without representation).
1993] THEORETICAL MEANING OF ALIEN SUFFRAGE
ed at numerous levels and in many forms, the principle of no
taxation without representation would argue for enfranchising the
vast majority of aliens, who pay exactly the amount of local property
taxes, 29° federal income taxes,2 1 state income taxes, and state
and local sales taxes that they would pay if they were citizens.
292
B. Objections
The contemporary relevance of the arguments proposed by
Justice Blackenridge in 1809 might be challenged on two separate
grounds, one from a republican direction and one from a liberal
direction.
The republican challenge would contend that his argument
presupposes a common sense of membership and community
20 It might be objected, of course, that the only relevant tax for the purposes of
this discussion is the local property tax and that not all aliens own property. But
aliens who are tenants, in effect, pay property taxes through their rent. See MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 290A.04 (West 1989 & Supp. 1992) ("A refund shall be allowed each
claimant in the amount that property taxes payable or rent constituting property taxes
... ."); see also id. § 290.A03 ("'Rent constituting property taxes' means the amount
of gross rent actually paid... which is attributable... to the property tax paid on
the unit... ."); OR. REV. STAT. § 310.630 (1986 & 1992 Supp.) ("Rent constituting
property taxes.. . ."); Marjorie E. Powell, Note, Resolving the Problem of Undocumented
Workers in American Society: A Model Guest Worker Statute, 17 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 297,
300 n.14 (1984) ("Illegal aliens contribute tax revenue through sales taxes and
property taxes through rent payments.").
' See 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1(b) (1992) ("[A]ll citizens of the United States... and all
resident alien individuals are liable to the income taxes imposed by the Code....");
see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.14 (1979) ("As our cases have
emphasized resident aliens pay taxes.... ."); United States v. Gonzales, No. 89-F.1740,
1991 U.S. Dist. LExIS 3087, at *5 n.2 (D. Colo. Feb. 6, 1991) ("'All United States
citizens and resident aliens must pay federal income tax.") (quoting 26 C.F.R. § 1.1-
1(b)).
292 The analogy of municipal corporations to private corporations, of course, may
be rejected today. The argument is undoubtedly available that localities are no longer
thought of as independent and self-governing corporations. See Hunter v. Pittsburgh,
207 U.S. 161, 178-79 (1907) ("Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the
State created as convenient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers
of the State as may be entrusted to them."). See generally Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part I-The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85-99
(1990) ("[A] local government is merely an administrative arm of the state, utterly
lacking in autonomy or in constitutional rights against the state that created it."). On
this logic, the municipal electorate should presumably be vertically integrated with the
state and national electorate. Such an argument does not dojustice to the experience
or meanings of local democracy and participation. See generally Gerald E. Frug, The
City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059, 1059 (1980) (arguing that the city's
powerlessness against the state infringes on people's ability to participate in the
decisions that structure their lives).
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among citizens and noncitizens which simply does not exist today.
On a critique informed by "a repressive, exclusionary republican-
ism," 293 it could be further argued that the community's sense of
"social solidarism" today depends precisely on the exclusion of
those who are not citizens. 294 On this reading, the social solidari-
ty that was furnished by property, wealth or race distinctions when
alien suffrage existed in the nineteenth century is now provided
only by the citizenship requirement. Nothing now successfully binds
citizens and aliens together into a common political community.
There are three answers to this argument. The first is that it
fairly condemns itself. Arguments for disenfranchisement based on
the idea that it will facilitate internal cohesion among the enfran-
chised are unprincipled. Arguments for disenfranchisement based
on the rejected group's insufficient connection to the dominant
society are tautological. It is not provable, as an empirical, much
less theoretical, matter that members of certain groups have, or do
not have, sufficient common interests or values to share a political
destiny. Thus, when opponents of inclusion make an argument
about insufficient commonality, they are only reinforcing and
deepening what they claim to bemoan: the social and existential
distance between those on the inside and those outside seeking
admission. Moral, social and political community among various
groups has never been created in America by isolating people from
one another. It is, rather, by including them together in the
deliberative political project-which Frank Michelman describes as
an "argumentative interchange among persons who recognize each
other as equal in authority and entitlement to respect"29 5 -that a
sense of community may be built. Of course, opponents of alien
29- C. Edwin Baker, Republican Liberalism: Liberal Rights and Republican Politics,
41 FLA. L. REV. 491, 505 (1989) (referring to the majority opinion in Lassiter v.
Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45 (1959) (upholding the lawfulness
of literacy tests)).
" Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional
Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 456 (1989) (describing how Justice
Nevius's pro-slavery opinion in the 1845 New Jersey case of State v. Post, 20 NJ.L.
368 (1845), "recalls an early modern, post-feudal world in which visionary social
solidarism could present as equality what we see as hierarchy"). Michelman, who has
been central to the recovery of the best tendencies in the republican tradition, shows
howJustice Nevius mobilizes republican values-"substantive common good, politically
grounded rights, deliberative process, political agency constitutive of personal
freedom"-to create ideological support for "a solidaristic, and concomitantly
hierarchical, sociological vision." Id.
295 Id. at 447 (describing a republican conception of "deliberative politics,"
contrasted with the liberal conception of "strategic politics").
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suffrage may actually be seeking to prevent the emergence of such
community. As Elizabeth Mensch and Alan Freeman point out,
romantic rhetoric about communitarianism and republican
character often conceals underlying realities of political domina-
tion.
296
Secondly, we must recognize that the differences between
citizens and noncitizens are probably much less significant than we
often imagine. The class of resident aliens, to begin with, includes
enormously variegated groups in terms of country of origin, reason
for emigrating, age, race, income and so on; they are likely to have
more in common with particular groups of citizens than they are
with each other. Resident noncitizen Irish may identify more
closely with Irish-Americans than they do with noncitizen Mexicans,
who in turn may inhabit Mexican-American communities but know
nothing about Canadian expatriate enclaves in Maine, and so on.
Moreover, most immigrant aliens have made important ties to their
local communities through marriage, friendship, church, and work.
Finally, aliens are now seen as sufficiently integrated to justify
their membership in most intermediate social institutions. As Cass
Sunstein notes, "[c]itizenship, understood in republican fashion,
does not occur solely through official organs."297 On this under-
standing, aliens already participate in numerous forms of citizen
action. They occupy university faculty positions, belong to
community associations and political clubs, participate in women's
organizations, and join (and lead) labor unions under the protection
of the National Labor Relations Act.298  Alien shareholders in
American private corporations have always maintained the right to
vote in shareholder elections. This fact is not thought to create any
296 See Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, A Republican Agenda for Hobbesian
America?, 41 FLA. L. REV. 581,599 (1989) (arguing that the "fiction of 'sovereignty of
the people' which legitimates a constitutional structure far removed from direct,
participatory democracy, serves to perpetuate the illusion that as Americans we really
do speak as 'the people,' even though the political reality is far closer to the alienated,
transactional world of Dahl (or Hobbes)," and calling for a rejection of romanticism
about republican ideals and a direct political confrontation with "our Hobbesian
reality").
29 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539,1573(1988).
298 Se4 e.g., NLRB v. Apollo Tire Co., 604 F.2d 1180, 1181 (9th Cir. 1979)
(holding that employed aliens, even undocumented aliens, are "employees" within the
meaning of the National Labor Relations Act and as such are entitled to file unfair
labor practice claims); Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563
F. Supp. 157, 159 (D.C. 1983) (labor unions legally bound under Act to provide
protection to alien members).
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public risk even though the actions of many private corporations
affect the national interest far more than the actions of most cities
and towns, and even though each municipal inhabitant is confined
to one vote while alien shareholders can own a majority of the
voting shares of corporate stock.
The second objection to enlisting classical democratic theory on
behalf of alien suffrage might accept the liberal rights approach but
deny that there is anything tyrannical about citizens ruling nonciti-
zens when the noncitizens have the opportunity to become citizens
and members. In the United States, resident aliens may be
naturalized after five years if they can demonstrate, inter alia, good
moral character and the ability to write and speak in simple Eng-
lish.29 9 It may be argued that this relative ease of naturalization
changes the character of governance by citizens over aliens because
noncitizens can presumably bring the relationship to a close.3
0 0
On the other hand, the Athenian metics, whom Michael Walzer
discusses, never had the chance to become citizens, nor do many
European guest workers today.30 1  These voteless noncitizens
choose only between continuing to work without political rights or
leaving the host country altogether. By way of comparison, resident
aliens in the United States are not permanently locked in a voteless
situation.
This argument is not without force, but the tyranny involved in
citizen rule over noncitizens is only mitigated, not removed, when
a five-year track to citizenship is available. Consider first those
immigrant aliens who plan, and have the resources, to naturalize in
the shortest possible time of five years: those on a citizenship "fast-
track."3 0 2  Even five years is a very long time to be voteless,
lacking the crucial form of social recognition, in a community in
which you live, work, socialize, pay taxes, use public services, and
send your children to school. This point is clear from at least three
299 See 8 U.S.C §§ 1423(1), 1427(a)(3) (1988).
300 See WALZER, supra note 265, at 61 ("No democratic state can tolerate the
establishment of afixed status between citizen and foreigner (though there can be
stages in the transition from one of these political identities to the other)."). Walzer
does not address the possibility of extending voting rights for noncitizens, but
presumably this practice could be, in his terms, one of the "stages in the transition"
from one political identity to the other.
30' See id. at 58.
302 See Rosberg, supra note 13, at 1110 (maintaining that those immigrants
admitted for permanent residence with the right to live and work anywhere in the
United States are resident aliens on a citizenship track).
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legal and constitutional judgments passed on efforts to disenfran-
chise people for a period of even less than five years.
First of all, courts have repeatedly struck down state policies
forbidding college students to register to vote in their campus
communities, despite the fact that the majority of college students
will only be residents in those communities for four years, if not
less.3 03 The courts have emphasized that the four years spent at
college are sufficient to generate community attachments and
responsibilities. As the Supreme Court of NewJersey stated, college
students registering to vote:
are subject to and concerned with not only the state laws and
regulations but with the local laws and regulations as well. It is
there that they pay their sales and gasoline taxes along with any
other applicable charges, it is there that they deal with the local
courts and local governmental bodies, and it is there that they are
classified as residents by the Census Bureau.
30 4
Secondly, in Dunn v. Blumstein,30 5 the Supreme Court struck
down, on both equal protection and right to travel grounds, a
Tennessee statute confining the vote to persons who had been
residents of the state for one year and residents of their county for
three months.8 0 6 The Court rejected the claim that "durational
residence requirements are necessary to further a compelling state
interest,"307 and specifically found impermissible "Tennessee's
303 See, e.g., Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1986) (upholding injunction
against Westchester County Board of Elections' policy of rejecting college students'
voter applications); Whatley v. Clark, 482 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1973) (striking down as
a violation of equal protection a statutory presumption that college students have not
acquired voting residence in campus home); Hershkoff v. Board of Registrars of
Voters, 321 N.E.2d 656 (Mass. 1974) (compelling registration of college students in
Worcester and finding that if they have an intention to make their campus residence
their home "for the time at least," it becomes their domicile "even if they intend to
move later on.. ."); Wilkins v. Bentley, 189 N.W.2d 423 (Mich. 1971) (invalidating
as due process violation a statute providing that no elector may acquire a voting
residence while in school).
304 Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 294 A.2d 233, 347 (N.J. 1972)
(striking down, in the absence of a compelling state interest, restriction against
registration of college students in their campus communities). All of the charac-
teristics mentioned in the text also apply to aliens, including being counted in the
Census. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c. 3.
305 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
306 See id. at 360; see also Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (striking down on
equal protection grounds a provision of the Texas Constitution prohibiting any
member of the U.S. armed forces who moved to Texas during his or her military duty
from registering to vote there).
307 Dunn, 405 U.S. at 360.
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hopes for voters with a 'common interest in all matters pertaining
to [the community's] government' ..... -8 The Court stated:
To paraphrase what we said elsewhere, "All too often, lack of a
['common interest'] might mean no more than a different
interest." "[D]ifferences of opinion" may not be the basis for
excluding any group or person from the franchise. "[T]he fact
that newly arrived [Tennesseeans] may have a more national
outlook than longtime residents, or even may retain a viewpoint
characteristic of the region from which they have come, is a
constitutionally impermissible reason for depriving them of their
chance to influence the electoral vote of their new home State."
309
The argument that durational residence requirements guarantee
"the knowledgeable exercise of the franchise," was seriously under-
and over-inclusive according to the Court.3 10 It stated that such
requirements "crudely exclude large numbers of fully qualified
people."
3 11
Consider, finally, the enactment of the Twenty-Sixth Amend-
ment in 1971, extending the franchise to eighteen-year-olds. If ever
there was a case in which a class of disenfranchised voters could
presumably wait their turn to vote, it was surely eighteen to twenty-
one-year-olds. Members of this class had already won, by statute,
the federal right to vote, were guaranteed of voting in state
elections on their twenty-first birthdays, and were forced to miss
only one, at most two, local election cycles.3 12 But this relatively
brief period of three years disenfranchisement was deemed so
unfair as to require an amendment to the constitution, a proposi-
tion eventually endorsed by thirty-nine states.3 13 A key argument
308 Id. at 355.
3o9 Id. at 355-56 (quoting Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 423 (1970); Cipriano
v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 705-06 (1969); Halls v. Beals, 396 U.S. 45, 53-54
(1969) (dissenting opinion)).
310 Id. at 358.
311 Id. The Court also asserted:
The classifications created by durational residence requirements obviously
permit any longtime resident to vote regardless of his knowledge of the
issues-and obviously many longtime residents do not have any. On the
other hand, the classifications bar from the franchise many other, admitted-
ly new, residents who have become at least minimally, and often fully,
informed about the issues.
Id.
312 See Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, Pub. L. No. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314
(1970) (amended 1975).
313 See U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI; 36 Fed. Reg. 12,725 (1971).
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on behalf of this amendment, ratified during the heyday of youth
protest against the Vietnam War, was that the draft age was
eighteen: it was often said by the young that those who were old
enough to fight were old enough to vote. 3 14 This time-honored
argument about enfranchising classes of people asked to serve in
the military should apply equally as well to aliens, who have been
subject, in various degrees, to military conscription ever since it
began during the Civil War.
15
It may still be objected that a great many aliens are not planning
to become citizens in the minimum five-year period. At first blush,
of course, this fact argues even more forcefully for local alien
voting: if it is undemocratic to disenfranchise aliens for a term of
five years, surely it is more unjust to disenfranchise them for ten or
twenty years. But the point may be pressed that, whether their
reasons are economic, political, familial, or psychological, those
aliens postponing or foregoing the opportunity to become citizens
have cast doubt on the durability of their loyalty or commitment to
the local community.
3 16
This point is vulnerable to sweeping criticism. Immigration law
already provides for deportation of alien persons who engage in
espionage, sabotage, revolutionary activity, terrorism, or any
conduct that "would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy
consequences for the United States."3 17 Moreover, our constitu-
sl The SenateJudiciary Committee Report issued with the proposed amendment
stated, inter alia, that young people had "earned the right to vote by bearing the
responsibilities of citizenship." S. REP. No. 26, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1971), reprinted
in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 931, 936.
s See Charles E. RohJr. & Frank K. Upham, Comment, The Status ofAliens Under
United States Draft Laws, 13 HARv. INT'L L.J. 501, 501-02 n.4 (1972) (noting that in
general, "male aliens within the age group designated by the draft laws have been
liable for conscription"); see also Neuman, supra note 13, at 306.
316 See Neuman, supra note 13, at 328.
Unwillingness to renounce a prior citizenship may reflect a wide variety of
factors. Sometimes unfavorable economic consequences under the former
country's law, such as forfeiture of accrued pension rights or ineligibility to
inherit from relatives, may be dominant. Political exiles may wish to
preserve the option of return in case of an unlikely change in the character
of the regime. Some business immigrants use the United States as a base
for international activities, while maintaining close ties with their home-
lands. Some immigrants expect ultimately to retire to the land of their
childhood. Others may have no intention to make practical use of their
prior citizenship, but view it as a part of their psychological identity that
they are reluctant to renounce.
317 8 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(4)(A)-(C) (Supp. II 1990).
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tional regime regards it as presumptively illegitimate to exclude
groups of persons from voting because it is thought that they will
somehow think or vote differently from the incumbent elector-
ate.3 18 But even assuming that an alien's reluctance to surrender
her nationality in accordance with American naturalization law
3 19
demonstrates a potential conflict in national loyalties, there is no
reason to think that this conflict has any relevance at the local level.
While my Canadian or Brazilian neighbors and I may have different
interests or approaches on international issues like acid rain or
regional trade, we presumably have identical interests in efficient
garbage collection, good public schools, speedy road repair, and so
on.320  Thus, the argument that citizens cannot afford political
participation by aliens fades rather quickly at the local level; indeed,
citizens may benefit by the increased level of participation in local
affairs as aliens come to share the responsibility, not only of
following the law, but of helping to shape it.3 2 1 In this regard,
there is every reason to follow the many historical and contempo-
rary precedents of localities (and states) which not only enfranchise
aliens but permit them to run for, and hold, public office at the
local level.
3 22
318 See Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94 (1965) ("'Fencing out' from the
franchise a sector of the population because of the way they may vote is constitution-
ally impermissible."). But see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979) (upholding the
constitutionality of a New York statute forbidding the employment as public
schoolteachers of aliens who decline to seek naturalization). "Appellees, and aliens
similarly situated, in effect have chosen to classify themselves. They prefer to retain
citizenship in a foreign country with the obligations it entails of primary duty and
loyalty." Id. at 80-81.l 1See 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a)(2) (1988) (requiring all naturalizing persons to
"renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign
prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom or which the petitioner was before
a subject or citizen").
320 This point was driven home in testimony by representatives of municipalities
which have noncitizen voting during hearings on Maryland Assembly Bill 665, which
would have forbidden localities to pass alien suffrage. See Testimony by the Village of
Martin's Additions Regarding Maryland Assembly Bill 665, at 2 (presented by Sharon
Hadary Coyle, Chairperson, Village Council) ("Incorporated municipalities such as
ours are concerned with the necessities of daily life-garbage collection, recycling,
paving streets, snow removal, tree maintenance, building permits-and for the larger
ones, crime prevention. As a municipality, our powers do not extend to national or
state-wide policies.") (on file with author).
321 See generally JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, BEYOND ADVERSARY DEMOCRACY (1983)
(discussing the general benefits of political participation); CAROLE PATEMAN,
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970) (same).
s22 See, e.g., State ex rel. Leche v. Fowler, 6 So. 602, 603 (La. 1889) (finding that
alien electors are qualified to hold the public office of coroner); McCarthy v. Froelke,
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C. Republicanism and Alien Suffrage
While the democratic argument for alien suffrage has tradition-
ally been formulated in the language of liberalism and natural rights
theory, it may also gain momentum from recent interest in the
recovery of civic republicanism as a political and constitutional
theory. Of course, abstract political theories do not resolve
concrete political questions,3 23 and, as noted, republican ideology
has often proven quite serviceable for exclusionary and reactionary
politics. But its contemporary exponents have been careful to
define republican politics as compatible with liberal rights and have
pushed the boundaries of republicanism out far enough to make its
normative commitments deeply relevant to the question of alien suf-
frage.3 24  If we can overcome the urge to identify the participa-
tory "citizens" of republican thought with the legal "citizens" of the
nation-state, then we can find much of value in the republican
revival.
Cass Sunstein has identified four governing principles to which
"liberal republicanism" is committed: deliberation in politics (or
"civic virtue"), the equality of political actors, universalism and the
notion of a common good, and "citizenship, manifesting itself in
broadly guaranteed rights of participation." 25 These principles
"are closely related to one another" and all support the develop-
63 Ind. 507, 510-11 (1878) (permitting alien electors in Indiana eligibility to become
township trustees); Woodcock v. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632, 640 (1863) (upholding "direct
and positive" statutory language extending to aliens the right to vote and "hold office
in towns and school districts").
-2- Cf. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
("General propositions do not decide concrete cases.").
324 See Sunstein, supra note 297, at 1541 (elaborating a version of republicanism
"that is not antiliberal at all"); see also Baker, supra note 293, at 493 (contrasting
Michelman's "liberal republicanism" with his own 'republican liberalism," which is
defined as a liberal conception of rights joined with a republican conception of
politics) The best republican scholarship acknowledges that republicanism and
liberalism are not two opposite political philosophies but continuous tendencies along
several independent axes of political ethics. See Michelman, supra note 294; Morton
J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 57 (1987). Horwitz asserts:
The argument becomes endlessly complex when one attempts to determine
who the liberals and the republicans were in 1789. Even Hamilton and
Jefferson will not easily fit the liberal or republican models, as these are only
ideal types. These models capture only implicit tendencies, which are, at
best, immanent in the thought of any one person.
Id. at 67.
325 Sunstein, supra note 297, at 1541.
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ment of the person as an equal and active citizen who can partici-
pate with others in the common project of local self-determina-
tion.3 26  Like Michelman, Sunstein emphasizes the personal
constitutive benefits of participation, which he describes as
"empathy, virtue, and feelings of community."327 While there is
nothing in this theory inherently requiring the political inclusion of
aliens (or for that matter, women or African-Americans), "the
renovation of political communities, by inclusion of those who have
been excluded, enhances everyone's political freedom."
3 28
The history of alien suffrage contains one theme which is
strikingly consistent with this reconstructed republicanism. Voting
by aliens in local elections was often portrayed as a kind of civic
education and training for the fuller rights of national citizen-
ship.329 The Supreme Court of Vermont emphasized this point
in 1863 in deciding, on statutory grounds, that aliens had the right
to vote and serve as school committee members in Vermont locali-
ties.330 The court rejected the argument that it was dangerous to
allow aliens to vote in municipal and school board elections because
they were ignorant of "the principles and policy of our govern-
ment."3 31 It stated that, apart from the clear statutory intention
to give aliens voting rights, "the objection itself [was un]-
sound."332 Vermont's policy, the court determined, was:
to extend to such emigrants all the rights of citizenship, that their
feelings and interests may become identified with the government
and the country. While awaiting the time when they are to
become entitled to the full rights of citizenship, it seems to us a
wise policy in the Legislature to allow them to participate in the
affairs of these minor municipal corporations, as in some degree
a preparatory fitting and training for the exercise of the more
important and extensive rights and duties of citizens.
333
326 See id. at 1556-57.
327 Id. at 1556.
328 Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1495 (1988).
329 See SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 54 (quoting PHILIP S. FONER, LIFE AND WRITINGS
OF FREDERICK DOUGLASs 509 (1955) ("Take the ballot from the Negro and you take
from him the means and motive that make for an education.").
330 See Woodcock v. Bolster, 35 Vt. 632, 640 (1863).
331 Id.
332 Id.
333 Id. at 640-41.
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The court also saw universal participatory access to the school
board as a catalyst for inter-generational involvement with American
education. The court stated:
It is of the greatest importance that the children of such persons
should be educated, at least to the extent for which opportunity is
afforded by our common schools, and that the parents should be
induced to send their children to school, and it seems to us that
they would be much more likely to do so, and to take interest in
their attendance and improvement, if allowed to participate in
their regulation and management, than if wholly excluded.
33 4
Thus, just as schools furnish a "democratic education" for children,
the opportunity to participate in the governance of schools
furnishes a "political education" for their parents.335  The elo-
quent logic of this idea may explain why, despite the general demise
of alien suffrage in large cities in this century, New York and
Chicago permit alien voting in school board elections today.
3 3 6
Our republican inheritance requires us to take seriously not only
the principles of no taxation and no governance without representa-
tion, but the cultural and educational benefits associated with
sharing the vote with all local "citizens." These benefits have to do
with the increased dignity and self-esteem which follow not simply
from voting, but also from having the right to vote, which is a
foundation of social recognition upon which the alien can build. To
exclude aliens from the local franchise is not only to deprive them
of any political influence over government, but to deny them the
benefits of "citizenship as standing."
Like other disenfranchised groups before them, aliens can often
experience their life here as "members of a professedly democratic
society that [is] actively and purposefully false to its own vaunted
principles by refusing to accept [them] or to recognize their right to
be voters."3 37 Immigrants who have come to the U.S. with great
3-" Id. at 641.
335 See AMY GuT-rMAN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 287 (1987) ("Political education
prepares citizens to participate in consciously reproducing their society, and conscious
social reproduction is the ideal not only of democratic education but also of
democratic politics . . ").316 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, para. 34-2.1(d)(ii) (Supp. 1992); N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 2590-c(3) (McKinney Supp. 1993); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77
(1979) ("Other authorities have perceived public schools as an 'assimilative force' by
which diverse and conflicting elements in our society are brought together on a broad
but common ground.").
337 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 14.
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dreams are thus rendered, for the time being at least, politically and
socially invisible. Frederick Douglass once said that since democrat-
ic government is based on the principle of universal voting, "to rule
us out is to make us an exception, to brand us with the stigma of
inferiority."133 To exclude aliens is not only to render them more
vulnerable to discriminatory legislation, but to stigmatize them as
less worthy than citizens.
3 39
D. Community-Based Democracy and Human Rights:
A Human Right to Local Democracy?
While nationalism prevailed in defining citizenship for voting
purposes in the earlier part of the twentieth century, the unification
of national economies into a global market system at the end of this
century undermines the salience of national identity and increases
the historical importance of defining a citizenship of place and
locality.3 40 It has become clear that "[c]ities are spatial locations
in a globally interdependent system of production and ex-
change." 341 The new global order is a "web of relations that
increasingly synchronizes the lives of people on a global scale."
3 42
Wherever human beings find themselves living, they face the
consequences of this "global web of socioeconomic and political
relations.
" 343
338 FONER, supra note 11, at 75.
339 The foregoing arguments invite the question of whether local alien suffrage
should apply not only to legal aliens but illegal aliens as well. As a theoretical matter,
it can be argued that the alien's voting status vis-a-vis the federal government is
irrelevant for defining local citizenship. Moreover, the vagaries of immigration law
often make lawful resident aliens technically "illegal" for short periods of time. But
this position is objectionable because the municipality should respect the decision of
the federal government regarding the lawful presence of aliens within the country.
As a practical matter, this explosive question is almost certainly much ado about
nothing since illegal aliens living in fear of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service would never register to vote and thus put their names and addresses on a
public document readily available to federal authorities. This last point convinced
Takoma Park not to distinguish between legal and illegal aliens, but other municipali-
ties could err on the side of caution by enfranchising "all residents lawfully present
and domiciled in the community."
340 On the growing internationalization of domestic economies and its relationship
to cities, see generally THE CAPITALIST CITY (Michael P. Smith &Joe R. Feagin eds.,
1987); Michael Timberlake, The World-System Perspective and Urbanization, in
URBANIZATION IN THE WORLD-ECONOMY 3 (Michael Timberlake ed., 1985).
341 Richard C. Hill & Joe R. Feagin, Detroit and Houston: Two Cities in Global
Perspective, in THE CAPITALIST CITY, supra note 340, at 155.
2 Michael P. Smith & Richard Tardanico, Urban Theoty Reconsidered: Production,
Reproduction and Collective Action, in THE CAPITALIST CITY, supra note 340, at 87, 92.
343 Id.; see also Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaulation
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While the globalizing process is fraught with danger for local
communities,M44 a great many cities have taken the offensive by
asserting their right to be involved in the conduct of foreign policy
and to govern the local effects of international relations. 45  As
Chadwick Alger writes, "people are becoming aware that the
intrinsic character of a global issue is that it affects all human
settlements. This being the case, it ought to be possible to act on
the local manifestation of that issue."3 46 One important example
of such action in the United States is the grass roots movement to
offer sanctuary to refugees from war-torn countries like El Salvador
and Guatemala.
3 47
The move towards local noncitizen voting can be seen as part of
the trend of communities accepting responsibility for participating
in the enforcement of global human rights norms. In this sense,
Takoma Park, Maryland, which recently enacted noncitizen voting,
was only following up on its earlier decision to make itself a
sanctuary city.3 48  After securing the right of Salvadorean and
Guatemalan immigrants to live free from war and political persecu-
of American Citizenship, in IMMIGRATION AND THE PoLTIcs OF CITIZENSHIP IN EUROPE
AND NORTH AMERICA 51, 64-65 (William R. Brubaker ed., 1989) ("Transnational
economic relationships are ubiquitous, international travel has become inexpensive,
migratory pressures are already enormous and are steadily increasing, environmental
problems are global, scientific and cultural exchange are highly valued, and political
cooperation among nations is more essential than ever before.").
344 See, e.g., David C. Perry, The Politics of Dependenty in Deindustrializing America:
The Case of Buffalo, New York, in THE CAPITALIST, supra note ?, at 113 (describing
Buffalo as a "victim of global economic change" by which industrial production shifts
to the Third World, accomplishing a new international division of labor); Saskia
Sassen-Koob, Growth and Informalization at the Core: A Preliminary Report on New York
City, in THE CAPITALIST CITY, supra note 340, at 138, 151 (detailing the correspon-
dence between economic disparity and the rise in "informalization," the trend toward
illegal work and production, subcontracting, industrial homework, and sweatshops).
345 See Chadwick F. Alger, The World Relations of Cities: Closing the Gap Between
Social Science Paradigms and Everyday Human Experience, 34 INT'L STUD. Q. 493, 495
(1990) (noting the "growing efforts in cities to respond to foreign policy issues...
such as nuclear free zones, conversion of military production to peaceful uses, the
struggle against apartheid, human rights, and foreign aid."); Shuman, supra note 32
at 158 (1992) (describing and approving the recent growth in community-based
democracy which addresses foreign policy).
346 Alger, supra note 345, at 505.
347 See id. at 509-10.
341 See Recommendations of Takoma Park Elections Task Force 1-2 (stating that
"Takoma Park's historic commitment to activist democracy and its status as a
Sanctuary city" is consistent with "the concept of allowing all residents of Takoma
Park, regardless of citizenship, to vote in city elections") (on file with author).
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tion, it extended to them the right to participate in the political life
of their new hometown.
Local noncitizen voting may thus reflect important changes in
the relevant locus of democratic citizenship.M 9 If the nation-state
has been weakened by various global forces and "[c]ommunity-based
democracy is sweeping the planet,"35 0 the argument for defining
citizenship as nationality and vertically imposing that choice on local
governments loses much force. Indeed, the straitjacket of nation-
state citizenship may stifle the widely perceived participatory
requirements of the time.
In its October 1986 report to the European Parliament, the
European Commission argued strongly for allowing all European
Community nationals to vote in local elections where they live,
regardless of citizenship:
The cornerstone of democracy is the right of voters to elect the
decision-making bodies of political assemblies at regular intervals.
If the right to vote is to be truly universal, it must be granted to
all residents of the territory concerned .... Universality, in the
original sense of the word, would imply that all residents,
irrespective of nationality, are included in the electorate.351
Similarly, the global Non-Governmental Organization Conference
released a document in Paris in December of 1991 stating: "It is the
natural, and thus universal right of people to partake in decision-
making that affect their lives, whether these decisions are taken
inside or outside their national boundaries." 52  On the other
hand, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is written in
such a way as to leave open the possibility that noncitizens will have
the right to vote, the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights confined the right of suffrage to citizens.
3 53
349 See ROBERT A. DAHL & EDWARD R. TUFrE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY 135 (1973)
(concluding that the existence of transnational power and sovereignty compels a
redefinition of democracy). "Rather than conceiving of democracy as located in a
particular kind of inclusive, sovereign unit, we must learn to conceive of democracy
spreading through a set of interrelated political systems, sometimes though not always
arranged like Chinese boxes, the smaller nesting in the larger." Id.
350 Shuman, supra note 32, at 158.
351 Voting Rights in Local Elections for Community Nationals Residing in a
Member State Other Than Their Own, COM(86)487 final at 11.
52 Non-Governmental Organization Conference, Draft Citizens Action Plan for
the 1990's at 16-17 (1991) (on file with author).
353 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N.
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 55, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (Article 25 states
that "[e]very citizen" shall possess voting rights.).
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At any rate, local alien suffrage has made much headway in the
last several decades, especially in Europe. In 1975 Sweden adopted
voting rights in local and regional elections for foreigners living in
the country for three years.2" In 1977 Denmark enacted a local
alien suffrage policy for Nordic immigrants which has since been
extended to give the right to vote and hold local office to all
immigrants of three years residence.55 Norway changed its
constitution to accomplish noncitizen voting in 1978, and now all
immigrants of three years residence may vote.3 56 Both Finland
and Iceland have extended local voting rights to Nordic citi-
zens. 57 The Netherlands accomplished local voting rights for all
immigrants in the early 1980s.3 58 And, in Switzerland, two can-
tons have written local alien suffrage into their constitutions.
3 59
A local alien suffrage provision has also appeared in the new
Constitution of Estonia.
3 60
But by far the most ambitious experiment in reciprocal local
alien suffrage is contained in the proposed Maastricht Treaty on
European Union.3 61 Article 8b of the Treaty states that:
Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he
is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a
candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he
resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. 62
Although this policy will be limited to citizens of member nations,
it would still mark an unprecedented and historic expansion of the
354 Jan Rath, Voting Rights, in THE PoLIIcAL RIGHTS OF MIGRANT WORKERS IN
WESTERN EUROPE 127, 134-35 (Zig Layton-Henry ed., 1990).
355 See id. at 136.
356 See id.
117 See id. at 137.
558 See id. at 138.
359 See id. at 128.
360 Article 156 of the 1992 Constitution of Estonia provides that in the election
of local governments, all persons at least 18 years old "who reside permanently within
the territory of that governmental unit" shall have the right to vote). See ESTONIA
CONST. ch. XIV, art. 156. There is, of course, an ongoing debate as to whether the
new Estonian constitution's citizenship provisions are too strict. See Riina Kionka,
Estonia: A Difficult Transition, 2 RFE/RL RES. REP. 89.
361 The Treaty confers citizenship in the Union on all persons "holding the
nationality of a Member State." Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 8, in
COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION 15 (1992)
[hereinafter Maastricht Treaty]. Unfortunately, the local voting provision contained
in Article 8b has apparently elicited criticism in France. See William Drozdiak, Despite
Danish Rejection, EC to Pursue Unification, WASH. POST, June 4, 1992, at A22.
362 Maastricht Treaty, supra note 361, at 15.
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scattered local alien suffrage policies now adopted by individual
European states.3 63  Implementation of this Article could spur
adoption of similar regional compacts all over the world.
The global push to confer local voting rights on all municipal
inhabitants underscores the significance of similar efforts in the
United States. As the world grows closer in terms of population
mobility, capital investment, labor markets, cultural production, and
high technology, it is imperative that we create political norms to
make these processes of integration consistent with democratic
values. The possibilities for exploiting displaced persons are too
great if we make capital and labor mobile but political rights
immobile.3 64  We cannot treat the world as a global economic
village but define it as a collection of remote islands for the
purposes of political participation. Eventually we may define a
human right to democratic participation.
3 65
IV. TOWARDS A REVIVAL OF AMERICAN NONCITIZEN VOTING
The United States is home to some ten million 66 aliens who
work in American businesses and government offices, serve in the
armed forces, pay local, state, and federal taxes, and are subject to
all of the obligations of citizenship, including military conscrip-
tion.3 67 Since noncitizen voting is neither constitutionally obliga-
tory nor taboo, states and municipalities may approach it as a
matter of public policy.3 68 But aliens are not presently permitted
363 See Rath, supra note 354, at 136-38.
364 Michael Walzer has remarked that "[s]tatelessness is a condition of infinite
danger." WALZER, supra note 265, at 32. We can improve its safety by giving
internationally displaced and homeless persons a modicum of local recognition,
respect, and influence.
365 See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance,
86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
366 See Deborah Sontag, Noncitizens and Right to Vote: Advocates for Immigrants
Explore Opening Up Balloting, N.Y. TIMES,July 31, 1992, at BI. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service general statistics suggests the number has more than doubled
since 1980. In 1991 alone, 1,827,167 immigrants were granted permanent resident
status in the United States. See 1991 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK, ADVANCED REPORT (1992).
367 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81, n.14 (1979) ("As our cases have
emphasized, resident aliens pay taxes, serve in the Armed Forces, and have made
significant contributions to our country in private and public endeavors."); Roh &
Upham, supra note 315, at 501 (discussing conscription policy in the United States
with respect to aliens).
368 For municipalities interested in adopting noncitizen voting policies, the
threshold question to be answered is whether state constitutional and statutory law
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to vote, or run for office, in any state election, and are therefore
shut out from formal political participation at both the state and
national level. 69 There are, however, several important examples
of noncitizen voting at the local level which can serve as models for
interested localities. Since 1968, New York City has granted
noncitizens who are the parents of school children the right to vote
and run for community school board.37' The City of Chicago
presently permits the extension of the vote in local elections to noncitizens. In some
states, such as South Carolina, it will probably be prohibited by the plain language of
the constitution. See S.C. CONsT. art. II, §§ 4, 5 (defining state electors as citizens
and providing that "[miunicipal electors shall possess the qualifications prescribed in
this Constitution"). But in many states, such as Maryland, the constitution and state
law is silent on the question of local electoral qualifications, and municipalities can
therefore decide to enfranchise noncitizens as an aspect of their constitutional or
legislative home rule power. See MD. CONST. art. I (omitting any reference to
municipal elections).
369 Fifty-eight constitutions specify that "citizens" may vote in state elections. See,
e.g., HAW. CONST. art. II, § 1 ("Every citizen of the United States who shall have
attained the age of eighteen years.. . ."); IND. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (same); N.J. CONST.
art. II, § 3(a) (same). Whether the language enfranchising "citizens" implies that the
franchise is exclusive to citizens and may not be extended to noncitizens by statute
could be an open question in some states, but it is definitely intended to be exclusive
in other states which replaced constitutional alien suffrage provisions with the
citizenship qualification.
The constitutions of Massachusetts and New Hampshire refer to "inhabitants."
See MASS. CONST. art. 1, § 9 ("All elections ought to be free; and all the inhabitants of
this Commonwealth. . .") (emphasis added); N.H. CONST. art. 11 ("All elections are
to be free, and every inhabitant of the state...."). Both states, however, have limited
the franchise to citizens by statute. See MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 51, § 1 (Law. Co-op.
1990) ("every citizen"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 654:1 (1986) ("Every inhabitant of the
state ... being a citizen of the United States."). There are no reported cases in
Massachusetts or New Hampshire in which an alien has sued alleging that her
constitutional right to vote has been abridged by statute. In Massachusetts, hostile
precedent for such a suit exists in a case in which the SupremeJudicial Court stated
that "if the people intended to impart a portion of their political rights to aliens, this
intention ought not be collected from general words, which do not necessarily imply
it, but from clear and manifest expressions, which are not to be misunderstood."
Opinion of the Justices, 7 Mass 523, 525 (1811).
370 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2590-c(4) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (enfranchising,
in community school board elections, registered voters and "every parent of a child
attending any school under the jurisdiction of the community board of such district
who is a citizen of the state"); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 81 n.15 (1979)
(stating that New York State Education Commissioner has "interpreted the statute
governing New York City's unique community school boards to permit aliens who are
the parents of public school students to participate in these boards.") (citation
omitted); Mary Anne Perez, Quezada 's Bid ForNoncitizen Vote Debated, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
19, 1992 (Nuestro Tiempo), at 1 (noting that voting eligibility of parents in school
board elections in New York city spurs rally by noncitizen parents for enfranchise-
ment in L.A. school board elections).
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similarly gives noncitizens the right to vote in school board elections.3
71
More expansively, a number of smaller localities in the State of
Maryland-including Somerset, Barnesville, Chevy Chase Sections 3
and 5, and Martin's Additions-have for decades extended the
franchise in all local elections to inhabitants who are not U.S. citi-
zens.372 As more intimate communities whose alien populations
are apparently composed, in substantial part, of World Bank and
embassy personnel working in Washington, D.C., these Maryland
jurisdictions rest their policies on both natural rights understand-
ings and the early property-based conception of local voting
rights.837  It is necessary to note that most of the inhabitants of
these small communities tend to share a similar economic and social
status which dilutes the threatening image many citizens have of
aliens. They also share a physical proximity which permits them to
have unrushed and disarming face-to-face encounters with one
another.
3 74
371 See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, para. 34-2.1(d)(ii) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1992)
("Eligible voters ... shall consist of the parents and community residents."); School
Board Holds Off On Noncitizen Voters, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 21, 1992, at B2 ("Noncitizens
already exercise voting rights in several cities and states, including Chicago. .. ").
372 See Beth Kaiman & Lynne K. Varner, Immigrant Voting Advances in Takoma
Park, WASH. POST,Jan. 30,1992, at Ml, M2 (listing Montgomery County communities
that do no require voters to be citizens).
373 For example, the Chair of the Village of Martin's Additions Council gave this
testimony before the Maryland General Assembly Committee on Constitutional and
Administrative Law:
We believe every resident in our community-regardless of ultimate national
or state citizenship-is entitled as a fundamental right to participate in
governing our municipal affairs-to have a say in whether we will pave the
street in front of his or her house-to influence garbage collection and
recycling-and to ensure that the streets are plowed in the winter.
Moreover, the burden is also one of equity, because the residents for
whom we argue here, bear responsibilities within the municipality-such as
keeping their properties neat and clean, removing snow from the sidewalk
in front of their homes, recycling-responsibilities from which they receive
no immunity merely because they may not be U.S. citizens. Certainly then,
these residents should have a say in how our community will be run.
Further, the fact that many of the non-U.S. citizens resident in our
community own their homes and pay property taxes grants them a strong
vested interest in maintaining the quality of life in the community in which
they have invested.
Hearings on H.R. 665 Before the Maryland General Assembly Comm. on Const. and Admin.
Law (1992) (statement of Sharon Hadary Coyle, Chairman of the Village of Martin's
Additions' Village Council) (on file with author).
374 See id. at 2 ("The residents of our small Maryland municipalities feel fortunate
to have the opportunity to participate actively in a local political system where the
town meeting ethic survives and flourishes. Elected officials are our neighbors....").
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But noncitizen voting in Maryland is not (simply, at least) a
naive throwback to nineteenth-century small-town life. For on
March 31, 1992, Takoma Park, Maryland, a well-integrated city
bordering the District of Columbia with a population of 16,700,
formally amended its municipal charter to give all residents,
regardless of citizenship, the right to vote, and run for office, in
local elections. The charter change followed several months of
excited political debate and controversy which spilled over into the
Washington, D.C. area as a whole. 75 The issue first arose when
the Takoma Park Elections Task Force completed its 1990 city
council redistricting process. The Task Force found that its new
wards had equal numbers of residents, as required by law, but that
some wards had far more eligible voters than others because some
contained a large alien population. This imbalance focused
attention on two facts: the votes of citizens in wards with high
citizen populations were worth much less than votes of citizens in
wards with high numbers of aliens 76; and many city residents
with all of the obligations of Takoma Park citizenship lacked the
right to vote. The Task Force, by and large unaware of the rich
history of alien suffrage in the United States, proposed to the City
Council that it place on the November 5, 1991 ballot a referendum
question on whether the citizens of Takoma Park favored extending
local voting rights to noncitizens. On September 30, 1991 the
Council voted to place the following non-binding question on the
ballot: "Should the Takoma Park City Charter be changed to permit
residents of Takoma Park who are not United States Citizens to vote
in Takoma Park elections?"
77
The referendum debate unleashed its share of xenophobia and
prejudice, but the discussion was generally remarkable for its
375 See Melanie Howard, Ballot Proposes VoteforAliens, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1991,
at B1. ("The referendum has drawn outside attention to an election that normally
would concern only the city of 16,000, and sparked passionate debate over who has
the right to actively participate in government at its most local level.").
376That is, the vote of a citizen in Ward A (with a low alien population)
represented a smaller "share" of a Councilmember's electorate than the vote of a
citizen in Ward D (with a high alien population). This disparity clearly violates the
principle of political equality which Jonathan W. Still, in an important article calls
"equal shares." SeeJonathan W. Still, Political Equality and Election Systems, 91 ETHICS
375, 378 (1981) (defining "equal shares" as a situation in which each voter has the
same share in the election as reflected in "what the voter voted on divided by the
number of voters who voted on it").
377 City Council of Takoma Res. #1991-75 (introduced by Council member Leary)
(on file with author).
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sobriety. Advocates of the charter amendment mobilized democrat-
ic principles to argue for the change and emphasized the local
nature of the proposal.378 The Share the Vote campaign worked
to humanize the question by bringing to public attention a number
of people, who had come to Takoma Park from all over the world
and who would be enfranchised by the change. The Washington
Post, for example, interviewed Colin Norman, a Washington
correspondent for a British magazine and a citizen of the United
Kingdom who came to Takoma Park in 1976.
[Norman] says he may be more a part of the city than U.S. citizens
who are newcomers to the area. "I have as much interest in the
community as anyone he said.... We're not asking for a voice at
the national level or in foreign policy," Norman said. "But in local
matters, we're no different than somebody who has moved to
Takoma Park from California."
379
Supporters of the change also observed "an urgent practical side to
this idea for those kept out of democracy's circle have other ways of
making their grievances known .... It is better to confront social
problems nonviolently in the halls of government than violently in
the streets."
3 8 0
Opponents of the measure emphasized that illegal aliens would
technically be able to vote along with permanent resident
aliens.3 8  The former commissioner of the Immigration and
378 See Jamin B. Raskin, Their Chance to Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 13, 1991, at C8.
There I stated:
The engine for this continuing democratic expansion is the beautiful
principle found in the Declaration of Independence: that governments
derive "their just powers from the consent of the governed." The circle of
political community must widen to take in all of those governed by the
community's decisions. This principle provides the logic for the charter
change in Takoma Park.
Id.
379 Beth Kaiman, Takoma Park Weighs Noncitizen Vote, WASH. POST, Oct. 31, 1991,
at M2. George Leventhal, co-chair of the Share the Vote campaign and husband of
a noncitizen, stated, "[a] non-citizen is just as affected by the decisions of the City
Council as anyone else." Id.
380 Raskin, supra note 378, at C8. I noted that:
[The rioting and] blind rage that overtook Mount Pleasant [in Washington,
D.C.] this past summer erupted against a background of neglect by the city
government that follows from the categorical exclusion of non-U.S. citizens
from the franchise. The Latino population of Washington has little political
power because it lacks the hard currency in which politicians trade: votes.
Id.
381 See Howard, supra note 375, at BI ("Many of those who [would be] given the
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Naturalization Service argued that alien suffrage "undermines the
value of U.S. citizenship" and that five years "is not an unreasonable
time to wait to be able to participate in our democracy." 82 He
also made a slippery slope argument that "if local voting by
noncitizens is allowed, state and federal voting could be next.
Either there is a policy basis for noncitizens to vote, or there is not.
If we open the door, it cannot be closed halfway."
3 8 3
The November 5, 1991 noncitizen voting referendum passed by
a vote of 1,199 to 1,107.384  Because the referendum was only
advisory, debate continued. But on February 10, 1992, the Takoma
Park City Council adopted, by a vote of five to one, a Charter
Amendment removing the requirement that voters and candidates
for public office in Takoma Park be U.S. citizens in order to
participate in the city's biennial elections.38 5 In the meantime,
DelegateJohn Morgan, who represents a district outside of Takoma
Park, introduced a bill in the Maryland House of Delegates to
prohibit noncitizen voting in local elections. 8 6 On February 11,
the House Committee on Constitutional and Administrative Law
conducted a lengthy and impassioned hearing on the legislation.
Bill proponents claimed that noncitizen voting would bring in a tide
of unwanted immigrants, while Takoma Park and other noncitizen
voting communities argued that this was a local question and home
rule should not be invaded.38 7 On March 17, 1992, the bill was
vote are those who have broken the law of the country getting here." (quoting
Cameron Whitman of the Federation for American Immigration Reform)); Alan C.
Nelson, Undermining Democracy in Takoma Park, WASH. POST, Dec. 8, 1991, at C8
("[T]he Takoma Park referendum did not distinguish between legal resident aliens
and illegal ones."). Charter amendment advocates, however, dismissed this possibility.
See Howard, supra note 375, at BI ("If you were living in the shadows and you were
frightened of being captured by the government, you wouldn't register your name on
a public document." (quoting Leventhal)).
382 Howard, supra note 375, at Bi.
383 Id.
384 See Stephanie Griffith, Hispanics Seek Wider Clout in D.C. and Va.: Takoma Park
Referendum on Voting Eligibility Spurs Immigrants' Interest, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 1991,
at D6.
38 See Notice of Amendment to the Municipal Charter of the City of Takoma Park
(on file with author).
386 H.B. 445, 407th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 1993). This bill was introducedJanuary
27, 1993 and assigned to the Judiciary Committee. See In the News: Md. Bill May
Thwart Takoma Park Vote, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1992, at MI.387 See Hearings on H.R. 665 Before the House of Delegates Comm. on Const. and
Admin. Law (Feb. 11, 1992) ("[This bill] threatens to take away our right and that of
5 other municipalities as home-rule governments to make such an important
decision.") (statement of PaulaJewell, Takoma Park City Clerk); Letter of Walter
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defeated by a vote of 11-6 and a final local effort to block imple-
mentation of the charter amendment fizzled. 8  On March 31,
1992, Takoma Park became the largest and most recent municipality
in the United States to adopt complete noncitizen voting. The move
was widely seen as heralding a new movement for local alien
suffrage and immediately triggered similar efforts in Washington,
D.C., Los Angeles, and New York City.
38 9
There are compelling instrumental reasons why municipalities
have chosen to embrace the resurgent logic of noncitizen voting.
These reasons should also persuade state legislatures to liberalize
the home rule power to facilitate enactment of local noncitizen
voting laws if it is not presently possible. Like earlier periods in
which noncitizen voting was a popular practice, this is a time of
heavy immigration. Of course, while immigration was once greatly
desired, as at the founding of the Republic, the present immigration
is accompanied by much official (and unofficial) ambivalence;
encouraging immigration will clearly not be a major part of any
renewal of the practice of alien suffrage.
But the people who have joined us on our land are generally
here to stay, and the question today is whether they will be
democratically integrated and assimilated into our political culture
or kept apart as a disenfranchised and increasingly disaffected
population. A number of immigrant groups continue to live on the
margins of American society.3 90  Recent cases of unrest, delin-
Behr, Mayor of Town of Somerset in Chevy Chase, Maryland (requesting the state to
permit them to maintain "a tradition that has worked well for all people in our
Town"). Testimony of Sharon Hadary Coyle, Chairperson of the Village Council of
Martin's Additions ("We can see no advantage in the State becoming involved in such
a minor and local decision-a decision which has no impact at any level above the
municipality .... We believe the decision to determine voting eligibility in municipal
elections should be a local decision .... ."). Testimony ofJamin B. Raskin ("This is
a decision that rightfully belongs at the local level, for it involves the community's
basic right and prerogative of political self-determination.") (on file with author).
388 See Memorandum from Paula S. Jewell, City Clerk to Takoma Park City
Council (Mar. 23, 1992) (declaring invalid for insufficient signatures a petition
requesting another referendum on the Charter Amendment) (on file with author).
389 See Around the Region: D.C. May Give Vote to Noncitizens, WASH. POST, May 7,
1992 at C5 (discussing Ward 1 D.C. Council Member Frank Smith's "legislation...
to grant local voting rights to immigrants who are legal permanent residents and have
applied for citizenship"); Perez, supra note 370, at 1 (noting that resolutions by
Takoma Park and otherjurisdictions have prompted noncitizen parents of L.A. school
districts to seek enfranchisement); Sontag, supra note 366, at B4 ("The New York
State Assembly's 24-member Task Force on New Americans plans to introduce a bill
this summer that will enable municipalities to extend the vote to immigrants who are
residents but not citizens.").
390 See Al Kamen, Myth of 'Model Minority 'Haunts Asian American: Stereotype Eclipses
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quency, and riot in immigrant communities, on both the east coast
and the west coast, illustrate the dangers of excluding large numbers
of people from political membership in their communities.
3 9 1
But it is no answer to say that members of these excluded groups
should simply apply for United States' citizenship; their very
alienation renders improbable their participation in the citizenship
naturalization process, which is more of an affirmation of a sense of
social belonging than a first step towards achieving this goal. The
virtue of extending the vote in local elections to noncitizens is that
it invites noncitizens to participate in, and learn about, American
political culture and practices without immediately requiring the
greater psychic break of surrendering one's given nationality.
Presumably the taste of democratic citizenship that some aliens get
from local voting will make them hunger for a greater role in our
politics. If so, the practice of alien suffrage, sometimes derided as
a threat to the naturalization process, can become once again, as it
was in the last two centuries, a pathway to naturalized citizenship.
CONCLUSION
The old-fashioned democratic principles justifying local alien
suffrage may find a new lease on life in the context of globalization
of economic and social institutions. As the coherence of the nation-
state is increasingly undermined by the global forces of economic
and cultural production, the locality may become at once the
individual's best hope for meaningful political participation and the
world's best hope for counteracting the deracinating and deperson-
alizing effects of the global economic system. Thus, the traditional
democratic arguments for alien suffrage, which are being revived by
surges in immigration, are united with the contemporary human
rights interest in making the right to participate in politics as mobile
as markets for capital and labor. This convergence of local and
Diverse Group s Problems, WASH. PosT,June 22,1992, at Al; Barbara Vobejda, Mexican
Americans Stall on Journey to U.S. Mainstream, WASH. PosT, June 21, 1992, at Al.
391 See Bill Boyarsky, Leaders Speak, But No One is Listening, L.A. TIMES, May 6,
1992, at B2 (noting that despite large number of immigrants from Latin American
and Asian countries in East L.A., they have no representation and little voting power,
which generates the kind ofresentment expressed in the L.A. riots); Nell Henderson,
Power at Ballot Box Eludes D.C. Hispanics: Task Force Attempts To Bridge the Gap, WASH.
POST, May 5, 1992, at Al (discussing a proposal to allow noncitizen vote in response
to race riot in hispanic community); Raskin, supra note 201, at B7 ("People frozen out
of democracy's circle learn to express their grievances and frustrations in other
ways..).
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global democratic pressures argues for making the locality both a
polity of presence and a central locus of participatory citizenship.
But my normative argument has elided one central question.
Have I proven too much? That is, why do the arguments mobilized
on behalf of local noncitizen voting not apply with equal force to
voting in state and national elections?
It is admittedly hard to think of any principled way to justify the
inclusion of aliens in local elections but their exclusion from state
elections. The problem is that the U.S. Constitution categorically
makes all persons enfranchised in state legislative elections into
federal electors, and alien participation in national elections
presents a far more troubling proposition. The exclusionary and
adversary definitions which have organized political membership in
the nation-state at least since World War I pose extraordinary legal,
political, and ideological obstacles to such a plan. It is no coinci-
dence that American alien suffrage fell victim to the political
ideology of World War I, which marked the modernization and
consolidation of the nation-state system. Before that war, alien
voting in national elections was common and quite thinkable; ever
since, alien voting in national elections has been non-existent and
seemingly unthinkable.
It has been beyond the scope of this Article to query the merits
of noncitizen voting in national elections. Suffice it to say that,
despite intense globalizing trends in economics, the ideological hold
of nationalism has not loosened significantly, and the political
interests of nation-states are still essentially organized counter to
one another. The idea of having foreign citizens vote in American
national elections is thus inherently more troubling than having
them vote in local elections. At the local level, each resident's
interests in good schools, public services, and transportation are
very similar. If these interests diverge at all, it will be according to
differences in neighborhood, income, or homeownership-not
nationality or citizenship. At the national level, however, American,
Mexican, and Canadian citizens arguably have numerous divergent
interests as citizens of their respective states.
To make alien suffrage in national elections acceptable to
existing nations, it would probably take regional international
agreements which provide for reciprocal noncitizen voting arrange-
ments modeled on something like an expanded Maastricht Treaty.
It is possible (as opponents of noncitizen voting have already
argued) that the spread of local alien suffrage would sufficiently
relax the global ideological hold of nationalism as to make people
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all over the world comfortable with the idea of making voting rights
mobile between nation-states.392 If we ever approach that Kantian
moment, when the world becomes an effective confederation of
republican nation-states and the right to vote travels with the
person, the U.S. Congress will have the Article I authority, under
Oregon v. Mitchell,3 93 to adopt noncitizen voting as a policy for
federal elections and possibly the Fourteenth Amendment enforce-
ment authority under Katzenbach v. Morgan3 94 to do the same for
state elections.3 95 Needless to say, such a moment is far off in the
next century and likely depends upon the prior success of numerous
decentralized local experiments with noncitizen voting all over the
world.39 6
392 See Alan C. Nelson, Undermining Democracy in Tahoma Park, WASH. POST, Dec.
8, 1991, at C8 (explaining that letting noncitizens vote is a bad idea for reasons of
public policy).
393 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
394 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
395 Oregon v. Mitchell established Congress's ample power, under Article I, to
define and broaden the federal electorate by adopting eighteen as the voting age for
federal elections. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 293 (1970). In Katzenbach v.
Morgan, the Court upheld Congress's authority, under § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, to advance equal protection under the laws by extending the right to
vote to all persons who had attended school in Puerto Rico at least through the sixth
grade regardless of English language skills. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
646-47 (1966). Significantly, the Court recognized this power despite acknowledging
that such a rule was not required by § I of the Fourteenth Amendment and that New
York's law requiring English language literacy was not necessarily in violation of the
substantive commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 656. Thus, the
position that Congress can enforce equal protection by enacting federal and state
alien suffrage is not in conflict with the argument made in Part III that § 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not require alien suffrage. At any rate, it is abundantly
clear from Morgan that Congress could prohibit "the State[s] from denying to [the
alien community] the right that is 'preservative of all rights.' This enhanced political
power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for
the entire [alien] community." Id. at 652 (quotingYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,
370 (1886)). In Morgan, the Court thus articulated an extremely deferential standard
of review for enforcement clause action by Congress. See id. at 653 ("It is not for us
to review the congressional resolution of these factors. It is enough that we be able
to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.")
Clearly aliens are a suspect class whose vulnerability in the political system Congress
could try to rectify by extending to them the vote. See also Sugarman v. Dougall, 413
U.S. 634, 646-69 (1973) (holding that aliens are a suspect classification).
Alien suffrage at all levels presumably could also be accomplished by way of an
international treaty. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW 226
(2d ed. 1988) ("Under the Supremacy Clause, it is indisputable that a valid treaty
overrides any conflicting state law, even on matters otherwise within state control."
(citing, inter alia, Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880) (upholding a treaty
establishing alien inheritance rights over a state law disqualifying aliens from
inheriting)).
396 Reciprocal noncitizen voting may, however, be part of a political program
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But it is possible right now to advance universal suffrage at the
local level and push American communities closer to becoming
polities of presence. From the beginning of American history, we
have maintained that democratic government must rest on the
consent of the governed. This principle has always been eloquently
articulated but, more often than not, honored in the breach. For,
as Shklar writes, "[t]he tension between an acknowledged ideology
of equal political rights and a deep and common desire to exclude
and reject large groups of human beings from citizenship has
marked every stage of the history of American democracy."
397
We often imagine the course of the franchise as an ever
widening one, progressing seamlessly toward the goals of universal
suffrage and popular sovereignty. The history of noncitizen voting
provides a potent counter-example to this conception.39 8  But it
also provides a challenge to the American political imagination at
the close of the twentieth century: can we relax received social
categories in order to make the franchise open up once again? Can
we come to see the U.S. citizenship requirement for voting in local
elections as arbitrary and undemocratic? The question takes us,
finally, away from the bright lines and right angles of constitutional
theory into the disheveled world of political practice. But the
culture of democracy permits a hopeful closing thought: through
the acts of memory, empathy, and imagination, what has been
undone by history can be recaptured in history, and then remade
for new purposes in a new time.
which will soon be necessary to counteract mounting anti-immigrant violence and
agitation in various parts of the world. See Ferdinand Protzman, Germany Fears Spread
of Rightist Unrest, N.Y. TIMES INT'L, Aug. 28, 1992, at A9 (discussing "nearly a week
of anti-immigrant rioting in Rostock," complete with violence and Hitler salutes, and
official fears that "rightist attacks against foreigners were spreading" to other German
cities).
397 SHKLAR, supra note 5, at 28.
398 Of course, it is not the only counter-example in our history to the myth of
linear progression in the franchise. Blacks voted and held office in impressive
numbers in the south during Reconstruction, but were quickly disenfranchised
thereafter for nearly a hundred years. See FONER, supra note 11, at 590-92, 604 ("An
enduring consequence of Reconstruction's failure, the Solid South helped define the
contours of American politics and weaken the prospects not simply of change in racial
matters but of progressive legislation in many other realms."); Armand Derfner,
Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26 VAND. L. R. 523, 524 (1973) (discussing
the shift away from black enfranchisement during Reconstruction to "total
disenfranchisement schemes" between 1890 to 1908, a period that lasted until the
modern civil rights movement). But alien disenfranchisement is today's most striking
evidence that we have not attained universal suffrage and that not all changes in
voting practices are inclusive ones.
